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FEDERAL SENTENCING AND THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF
REASONABLENESS REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
This spring, the United States Supreme Court will consider how ap-
pellate courts have implemented the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines")' since rendering its opinion in United States v. Booker.2
At issue is whether the courts have violated Booker by giving the Guide-
lines excessive weight when reviewing district court sentences .
Issued in 2005, Booker held that mandatory Guidelines violated a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because they required
judges instead of juries to find facts that enhanced sentences.4 The Court
remedied the constitutional violation in a separate opinion by excising
two provisions from the federal sentencing statute.5 The first, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(1), had mandated guideline sentences. 6 Removing this provi-
sion rendered the Guidelines "effectively advisory," 7 just one factor
among several that district courts would "consult ' 8 when imposing a
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 9 The court also excised a second
1. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2006) [hereinafter USSG], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/TABCON06.htm.
2. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases relating to the
Guidelines: United States v. Rita (No. 06-5754) and United States v. Claiborne (No. 06-5618).
Supreme Court of the United States, Miscellaneous Orders of the Court (certiorari granted), No-
vember 3, 2006, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/l10306pzr.pdf.
3. See Miscellaneous Orders of the Court, supra note 2.
4. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226-27 (finding that the Sixth Amendment applied to mandatory
Guidelines). For an overview of Booker, see Craig Green, Booker and Fanfan: The Untimely Death
(and Rebirth?) of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 93 GEO. L.J. 395 (2005).
5. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245, 259.
6. Id. at 245. Note that before Booker, district courts could depart from the Guidelines
range, but only in certain limited circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000).
7. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
8. Id. at 264.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) reads:
Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence. The court shall impose a sentence suffi-
cient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph
(2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed,
shall consider -
(I) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed -
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for -
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provision relating to appellate standards of review of the mandatory
guideline sentences, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). 10 Booker articulated a new
appellate standard whereby courts would review sentences for "unrea-
sonableness" in light of the § 3553(a) factors. 1
Though Booker was clear that the Guidelines' role in sentencing
and appellate review had changed, it was unclear exactly how.'2  The
Court did not explain what it would mean for judges to "consult" the
"effectively advisory" Guidelines, nor did it explain what weight they
would have among the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.13  The now-
amputated sentencing statute was similarly unclear, simply listing the
Guidelines among the sentencing factors. 14  Lacking specific guidance
from either Booker or the statute, federal courts themselves identified a
place for the Guidelines in the post-Booker landscape.
Some courts interpreted Booker as inaugurating a "sea change in
sentencing" and in the role of the Guidelines.15 This "Booker maximal-
ism ' ' 16 viewed Booker as having transformed a guideline-centric sentenc-
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of de
fendant as set forth in the guidelines-
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission... subject to any amendments made to
such guidelines by act of Congress... ; and
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date the defen
dant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable guide
lines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission... taking into ac
count any amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements by an act of
Congress... ;
(5) any pertinent policy statement -
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission... subject to any amendments made to
such policy statement by an act of Congress... ; and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the defendant
is sentenced.
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar re-
cords who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
Id.
10. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
11. Id. at 260-61. The § 3553(a) factors are listed supra note 9.
12. See David J. D'Addio, Note, Sentencing After Booker. The Impact of Appellate Review on
Defendants' Rights, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 173, 176 (2006); Adam Lamparello, The Unreason-
ableness of "Reasonableness" Review: Assessing Appellate Sentencing Jurisprudence after Booker,
18 FED. SENT'G REP. 174 (2006); Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Institutional Concerns Inherent in
Sentencing Regimes: The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1350 (2005) ("What Booker has done depends on what Booker means. If [the
opinion] is prescribing 'advisory' guidelines in the purse sense of helpful, but legally nonbinding
advice to sentencing judges, this ruling would certainly transform the nature of federal
sentencing ... ").
13. See sources cited supra note 12. The potential problem of this ambiguity did not go
unnoticed at the time. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 311 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) ("[N]o one knows.
how advisory Guidelines and 'unreasonableness' review will function in practice.").
14. The Guidelines are listed as the fourth factor, § 3553(a)(4). See also Booker, 543 U.S. at
304-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (noting that the sentencing statute "provides no order of prior-
ity among all [the § 3553(a)] factors").
15. Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 665, 666-67 (2006).
16. Id. at 666.
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ing system into one where judges "exercise reasoned judgment in the
course of a holistic sentencing decision-making process.' 7  Booker
maximalism relied on a plain reading of Booker and § 3553(a) in arguing
that the Guidelines no longer had a privileged place in sentencing. In-
stead, they were "just one of a number of sentencing factors" for judges
to consider.1
8
Other courts interpreted Booker as having made only a "modest ad-
justment" to the Guidelines' role in sentencing.' 9 This "Booker minimal-
ism''1° saw the Guidelines, while no longer mandatory, as nevertheless
21
meriting "considerable weight" in sentencing and on appellate review.
Booker minimalism had different contours among different courts,2 2 but
its essence was always the same-i.e., that the Guidelines have a dispro-
portionate weight vis-A-vis the other § 3553(a) factors. 23 Courts justified
this approach by arguing, for example, that the Guidelines accounted for
the other § 3553(a) factors24 or that they had a special role in promoting
sentencing uniformity.
25
Booker directed appellate courts to review district court sentences
for "unreasonableness, 26 and several circuits adopted distinctly Booker
minimalist methods for doing so. One method treated guideline sen-
tences as "presumptively reasonable" when reviewed on appeal.27
17. Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing and Punishment: Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 387, 412 (2006).
18. United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 986 (E.D. Wis. 2005); see also Simon v.
United States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40 (D.N.Y. 2005). The Ranum opinion was the most prominent
early articulation of Booker maximalism. See NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND
POLICY 57 (Supp. 2005).
19. McConnell, supra note 15, at 666-67.
20. Id. at 666.
21. United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005) (describing the promi-
nent role of the Guidelines in sentencing); United States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir.
2006) (describing the "heavy weight" given to the Guidelines on appellate review). The Wilson
opinion, issued less than 24 hours after the Supreme Court handed down Booker, was the most
prominent early articulation of Booker minimalism. See DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 18, at 56.
22. See discussion infra Part l.A-B, Part IV.B. 1.
23. See McConnell, supra note 15, at 667.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2006) (asserting that
the Guidelines incorporate the § 3553(a) factors); United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 735 (6th
Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring) ("[T]he guidelines remain the one § 3553(a) factor that accounts
for all § 3553(a) factors."); Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265 (10th Cir. 2006) ("The Guidelines, rather than
being at odds with the § 3553(a) factors, are instead the expert attempt of an experienced body to
weigh those factors in a variety of situations.").
25. See, e.g., Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 912; United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514,
519 (1st Cir. 2006) (en bane) ("To construct a reasonable sentence starting from scratch in every
case would defeat any chance at rough equality which remains a congressional objective."); Bu-
chanan, 449 F.3d at 738 (Sutton, J., concurring) ("Where else, at any rate, would a court of appeals
start in measuring the reasonableness of a sentence?"); United States v. Maloney, 466 F.3d 663, 668
(8th Cir. 2006).
26. Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-61.
27. Six circuits have held that guideline sentences are presumptively reasonable. See United
States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 555 (5th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mykytiuk,
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Courts would uphold these guideline sentences unless a party could show
unreasonableness in light of other § 3553(a) sentencing factors. 28 A sec-
ond popular Booker minimalist method of reasonableness review, "pro-
portionality," required that district courts provide "compelling reasons"
29whenever a sentence "substantially varie[d]" from the guideline range.
This spring, the Supreme Court will consider whether these two
Booker minimalist methods-presumptive reasonableness and propor-
tionality-can be part of a valid review for reasonableness. 30 An exami-
nation reveals that both are incompatible with Booker whenever there are
nonfrivolous § 3553(a) factors present for which the Guidelines either
fail to account or for which they inadequately account.
Part I of this comment outlines the Tenth Circuit's Booker minimal-
ist approach to reasonableness review, including its adoption of both
presumptive reasonableness and proportionality. Part II analyzes this
approach and the justifications the court offers for it. It also critiques the
court's apparent failure to address the "parsimony provision" at the heart
of § 3553(a). Part III argues that Booker minimalism is not unique to the
Tenth Circuit and that all of the other circuits share a guideline-centric
approach. Differences among circuits that have and have not adopted
presumptive reasonableness or proportionality, for example, tend to be
superficial rather than substantive. Part IV reviews what this spring's
two Supreme Court cases will mean for Booker minimalism. The super-
ficiality of the circuit disagreements about the issues the Court will con-
sider and the unusual facts in one of the cases raise interesting questions
about just what impact the decisions will have. Even if the Supreme
Court holds that presumptive reasonableness and proportionality are in-
valid methods of reasonableness review, it may have less of an impact on
Booker minimalism than might appear. Finally, Part V offers one ap-
proach to reasonableness review that rejects presumptive reasonableness
and proportionality whenever the Guidelines fail to account for or inade-
quately account for nonfrivolous factors that are properly considered
under § 3553(a). This approach would provide an appropriate balance
between guideline-centric Booker minimalism and the requirements of
Booker and § 3553(a).
415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006).
28. See, e.g., Mykytiuk, 435 F.3d at 608; Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Moreland,
437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 808 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729
(7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cage,
451 F.3d 585, 594 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1236-37 (11th Cir.
2006).
30. See Miscellaneous Orders of the Court, supra note 2.
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I. BOOKER MINIMALISM AND THE TENTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Booker3l requires appellate courts to review district
court sentences for reasonableness in light of the sentencing factors in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).32 These factors include the nature of the offense and
characteristics of the defendant, as well as the need for the sentence to
reflect the seriousness of the crime, to deter future criminal conduct, to
protect the public from further crimes, and to provide the defendant with
needed treatment.33  The statute also requires courts to consider the
Guidelines.3 4  If a sentence is unreasonable in light of these factors, it
must be reversed.3 5
While the Guidelines are only one § 3553(a) sentencing factor, the
essence of Booker minimalism is that they nevertheless have special
weight compared to the other factors.36 In its review of both guideline
and non-guideline sentences, the Tenth Circuit has adopted this Booker
minimalism. The court's preference for the Guidelines, though, is
checked by procedural requirements that ensure consideration of other
relevant § 3553(a) factors.
A. Components of Reasonableness Review and the Adoption of Pre-
sumptive Reasonableness
The Tenth Circuit outlined its approach to reasonableness review
and embraced Booker minimalism in United States v. Kristl.37 In Kristl,
the defendant pled guilty to knowingly possessing a firearm after having
been convicted of a felony.3 8 The district court calculated his guideline
range at 24-30 months, and sentenced him to 28 months. 39 The defen-
dant challenged the district court's guideline calculation and argued that
the sentence was unreasonable in light of Booker.40  While all of the
§ 3553(a) factors guide reasonableness review,4 ' Kristl's guideline-
specific appeal allowed the court to focus on the role of the Guidelines.
The court adopted a two-part approach to its sentencing review that
identified both procedural and substantive components of reasonable-
ness. 42  Procedural reasonableness asks whether a district court's sen-
31. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
32. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
33. 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(1)-(2) (2000). All of the § 3553(a) factors a district court must con-
sider are listed supra note 9.
34. § 3553(a)(4).
35. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
36. See McConnell, supra note 15, at 667.
37. 437 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 2006).
38. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1052.
39. Id. at 1052-53.
40. Id. at 1053.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1055 ("[T]he reasonableness standard of review set forth in Booker necessarily
encompasses both the reasonableness of the length of the sentence, as well as the method by which
the sentence was calculated.").
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tence was "reasoned, or calculated using a legitimate method. ' ,43 In addi-
tion to a properly calculated guideline range, 44 procedural reasonableness
requires a district court to "consider[] the § 3553(a) factors and explain[]
its reasoning" for imposing a particular sentence.4 ' An improper guide-
line calculation or failure to consider a relevant § 3553(a) factor renders
a sentence procedurally unreasonable and therefore reversible.46 Because
claims of procedural unreasonableness assert that the district court made
a legal error, they are reviewed de novo on appeal.47
The second part of appellate reasonableness review is substantive.48
It asks whether "the underlying facts and conclusions support [the] par-
ticular sentence [length]" in light of the § 3553(a) factors.4 9 To assist in
this review for substantive reasonableness, the Tenth Circuit adopted a
Booker minimalist approach that gave the Guidelines a prominent role. 0
In particular, Kristl endorsed the approach of a number of other circuits
in holding that sentences within the guideline range are presumed rea-
sonable on appeal.51 This presumption of reasonableness is a "deferen-
tial standard" 52 that either a defendant or the government can rebut in
light of other § 3553(a) factors. 53 In the absence of such a rebuttal, how-
ever, a guideline sentence will be upheld as reasonable.54
After identifying the components of reasonableness review, Kristl
turned to the defendant's sentence.55  The court faulted the district
court's guideline calculation, finding that it had improperly accounted for
the defendant's criminal history.56 This error rendered the sentence pro-
cedurally unreasonable and resulted in a remand for resentencing.57
43. United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 591 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Kristl, 437 F.3d at
1054-55.
44. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055. The Guidelines must always be calculated in every sentencing
decision, as they are listed in § 3553(a) as one of the factors that a sentencing judge must consider.
See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 748-49 (10th Cir. 2005).
45. Cage, 451 F.3d at 591.
46. Id.; Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1058-59.
47. See Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054 (noting a de novo review for claims that "consider[] the
district court's application" of the Guidelines or the other § 3553(a) factors); cf United States v.
Brown, 450 F.3d 76, 80 (1st Cir. 2006) ("We review the district court's interpretation of the Guide-
lines de novo.").
48. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055.
49. D'Addio, supra note 12, at 178.
50. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055.
51. Id. at 1053-55 (citing the adoption of presumptive reasonableness for guideline sentences
in the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth circuits, and adopting the presumption in the Tenth Circuit as
well).
52. Id. at 1054.
53. Id. at 1055.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1058-59.
57. Id. at 1059.
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The framework for reasonableness review outlined in Kristl would
guide the Tenth Circuit in subsequent inquiries. 58 In addition to identify-
ing procedural and substantive components of reasonableness, Kristl held
that guideline sentences are presumed substantively reasonable. This
adoption of presumptive reasonableness marked the Tenth Circuit's en-
dorsement of Booker minimalism. The presumption meant that the
Guidelines would be the one § 3553(a) factor that always had to be con-
sidered and that would serve as the starting point in reasonableness re-
view.59 Presumptive reasonableness also gave the Guidelines a dispro-
portionate weight among the § 3553(a) sentencing factors because it pre-
sumed-in the absence of other evidence-that the Guidelines corre-
spond to reasonableness. 60  No other § 3553(a) factor had this special
weight.6a
B. Substantive Unreasonableness and Proportionality
The Tenth Circuit's method of reviewing non-guideline sentences
provides more evidence of Booker minimalism's prominence in the
court.
In United States v. Cage, 62 the court vacated a procedurally reason-
able non-guideline sentence after finding it substantively unreasonable.63
In that case, the defendant pled guilty to methamphetamine distribution
charges. 4 Her offense level and criminal history yielded a guideline
range of 46-57 months.65  The district court imposed a six-day sen-
tence,66 however, citing mitigating § 3553(a) factors as justification for
the variance.67 The factors included the defendant's son's medical prob-
lems, the defendant's minor role in the conspiracy, her lack of criminal
history, her education, employment history, and the unlikelihood she
would reoffend.68 Cage held that the district court properly considered
58. A number of subsequent Tenth Circuit reasonableness review cases cited Kristl. See, e.g.,
United States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006); Cage, 451 F.3d at 591; United States
v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1116-17 (10th Cir. 2006).
59. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055; Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1264 ("The Guidelines continue to be the
starting point ... for this court's reasonableness review on appeal." (citing United States v. John H.
Sitting Bear, 436 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
60. See Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055.
61. See, e.g., Cage, 451 F.3d at 593 (noting that the Guidelines are "not just one factor among
many"); see also discussion infra Part I.B-C.
62. 451 F.3d 585 (10th Cir. 2006).
63. Cage, 451 F.3d at 591. Cage was the Tenth Circuit's first substantively unreasonable
sentence after Booker. Id. ("This is an issue of first impression for this court; we have neither ex-
plained what causes a sentence below the recommended guidelines range sentence to be unreason-
able, nor how such decisions are treated on appeal."). Recall that in Kristl, the court vacated the
defendant's sentence on procedural rather than substantive grounds. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1058-59.
64. Cage, 451 F.3d at 587.
65. Id. at 588.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 588, 595.
68. Id. at 595.
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these mitigating factors under § 3553(a). 69  The problem with the sen-
tence, however, was in "the weight the district court placed on [the fac-
tors]. 7°
Cage then articulated a distinctly Booker minimalist method-
proportionality-of evaluating the substantive reasonableness of non-
guideline sentences. 7' Here, the six-day sentence was well below the
guideline range and not entitled to a presumption of reasonableness.72
The presumption of reasonableness for guideline sentences, however,
"[spoke] to how [the court] should consider sentences outside the guide-
lines range" as well. 73 The court held that for a non-guideline sentence
to withstand review for substantive reasonableness, the mitigating
§ 3553(a) factors must be proportional to the extent of the variance from
the guideline range. 74  Thus, an extraordinary variance "must be sup-
ported by extraordinary circumstances., 75  Applying the method to the
facts before it, Cage held that the sentence was unreasonable because the
defendant's circumstances did not justify such an "extraordinary" vari-
ance. 76
Though the variance in Cage was extreme, the case highlights the
influence of Booker minimalism in the Tenth Circuit's reasonableness
review. Regardless of the length of a sentence, the Guidelines are the
central measure of reasonableness. Sentences falling within them are
presumptively reasonable,77 while those falling outside of them must be
78
supported by justifications proportional to the variance.
The Tenth Circuit's reasonableness review for guideline as well as
non-guideline sentences therefore reflects a Booker minimalist approach.
69. Id. The Cage court did not explore the fact that some of the mitigating § 3553(a) factors
cited by the district court as reasons for varying the sentence downward were already accounted for
in the Guidelines. For example, a defendant's guideline offense level is already lowered if a defen-
dant had a "minimal" or "minor" role in the criminal activity. See USSG, supra note 1, § 3B1.2.
The Guidelines also account for a defendant's lack of criminal history. See id. § 4A1.1.
70. Cage, 451 F.3d at 595.
71. This spring, the Supreme Court will review precisely the same standard that the Cage
court elaborated here. See Miscellaneous Orders of the Court, supra note 2 (discussing certiorari in
United States v. Claiborne).
72. Cage, 451 F.3d at 594.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. (quoting United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he farther the
judge's sentence departs from the guidelines sentence . . . the more compelling the justification
based on factors in section 3553(a) that the judge must offer in order to enable the court of appeals to
assess the reasonableness of the sentence imposed.").
75. Id. (quoting United States v. Kendall, 446 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 2006)). Cage emphasized
that departures above the Guidelines as well as those below are subject to the same appellate scru-
tiny. Id. at 595 n.5.
76. Id. at 594.
77. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054-55.
78. Subsequent Tenth Circuit cases have described proportionality in terms of degrees of
scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 469 F.3d 896, 907 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he extremity of
the variance between the actual sentence imposed and the applicable Guidelines range should deter-
mine the amount of scrutiny we give to the district court's substantive sentence.").
[Vol. 84:3
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C. Justifications for Booker Minimalism
Although the Guidelines are only one of the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors, the Tenth Circuit has justified giving them special weight in ap-
pellate review for three reasons.
First, the court has said that the Guidelines are the one § 3553(a)
factor that accounts for the other § 3553(a) factors.79 The Guidelines are
"the expert attempt" of the United States Sentencing Commission
("USSC") to "weigh [the § 3553(a) sentencing] factors in a variety of
situations." 80 As such, they "are generally an accurate application of
[these] factors" 8 ' and merit special weight.
82
Second, the court has said that in directing the USSC to promulgate
Guidelines, Congress intended that sentencing discretion "be limited by
the decisions of a publicly accountable body. 8 3  The Guidelines are
therefore unique among the § 3553(a) factors because they are "an ex-
pression of popular political will about sentencing." 84  Furthermore, in
saving the Guidelines by making them advisory, Booker "refus[ed] to use
the Sixth Amendment to nullify the entirety of Congress's purpose" in
establishing a responsive, democratic influence over sentencing. 85 Be-
cause that influence is represented in the Guidelines, they should con-
tinue to have a special place in appellate review.
Third, the court has asserted that Booker minimalism is important in
preventing "vastly divergent sentences" among those committing similar
crimes and having similar backgrounds.86 The court has emphasized that
Congress's intent in passing the 1984 Sentencing Act was promoting
sentencing uniformity.87 Because the Guidelines are the only sentencing
79. Cage, 451 F.3d at 594 (citing Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265); see also Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054
(citing United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 607 (7th Cir. 2005)). The Kristl court quoted
Mykytiuk's argument that Guidelines informed the other § 3553(a) factors, but did not explicitly
endorse this rationale itself, choosing instead to focus on the sentencing goal of uniformity. Id.
80. Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265.
81. Cage, 451 F.3d at 594 (quoting Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265).
82. Id. at 593. ("It would be startling to discover that while Congress had created an expert
agency, approved the agency's members, directed the agency to promulgate Guidelines . . . and
adjusted those Guidelines over a period of fifteen years, that the resulting Guidelines did not well
serve" the § 3553(a)(2) purposes of sentencing. (quoting United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d
910, 915 (D. Utah 2005))).
83. Cage, 451 F.3d at 593.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054 (quoting Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 738).
87. Cage, 451 F.3d at 593 ("The ... approach, which we now adopt... make[s] the guide-
lines system advisory while maintaining a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the
offender's real conduct-a connection important to the increased uniformity of sentencing that
Congress intended its Guidelines to achieve." (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246
(2005))).
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factor that provide a "uniform measure" in sentencing, they deserve spe-
cial weight among the § 3553(a) factors.88
D. Procedural Reasonableness as a Check on Booker Minimalism
While the Guidelines may have a special weight in the Tenth Cir-
cuit, deference to them is not absolute.89 One important limitation comes
in the distinction of procedural from substantive reasonableness.9" The
requirement that sentences be procedurally reasonable ensures that the
Guidelines are not the only relevant § 3553(a) factor used in sentenc-
ing.91
Procedural reasonableness requires, among other things, that a dis-
trict court consider a nonfrivolous argument based on § 3553(a) for a
non-guideline sentence. 92  In United States v. Sanchez-Juarez,93 the
Tenth Circuit vacated a sentence because the district court had apparently
failed to consider such an argument.94  In that case, the defendant dis-
puted a 16-level offense conduct increase in United States Sentencing
Guideline ("USSG") § 2L1.2.9' The defendant argued that the increase
was improper because it inaccurately accounted for a previous convic-
tion.96 At sentencing, the district court noted that it "[had] considered the
sentencing guidelines" but did not specifically address the argument
88. See Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 924 ("The only way of avoiding gross disparities in sen-
tencing from judge-to judge and district-to-district is for sentencing courts to apply some uniform
measure in all cases. The only standard currently available is the Sentencing Guidelines.").
89. The court has emphasized that the Guidelines cannot be "conclusively" reasonable be-
cause this would violate Booker's holding that the Guidelines are advisory. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054;
see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
90. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055; Cage, 451 F.3d at 591. Other circuits have also made this dis-
tinction. See Douglas A. Berman, Reasoning Through Reasonableness, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 142, 143 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/berman.html; D'Addio, supra note 12,
at 177, 179; see also United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that reason-
ableness review "is not limited to consideration of the length of the sentence," but encompasses
procedural considerations as well); United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006)
("Reasonableness review involves both procedural and substantive components."); United States v.
Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005) (arguing that appellate courts must consider "not only the
length of the sentence but also the factors evaluated and the procedures employed by the district
court in reaching its sentencing determination"); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 488 (7th
Cir. 2005) ("[R]easonableness depends not only on the length of the sentence but on the process by
which it is imposed.").
91. See Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117; United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 675-
76 (7th Cir. 2005). Part IV examines why this distinction is important in this spring's Supreme
Court case reviewing presumptive reasonableness.
92. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117; cf United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir.
2006) ("[A] rote statement of the § 3553(a) factors should not suffice if at sentencing either the
defendant or the prosecution properly raises a ground of recognized legal merit (provided it has a
factual basis) and the court fails to address it." (citation and quotation marks omitted)); United States
v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Where a defendant raises a particular argument
in seeking a lower sentence, the record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defen-
dant's argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it.").
93. 446 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2006).
94. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1118.
95. Id. at 1117. USSG § 2L1.2 is an offense conduct section in the Sentencing Guidelines
Manual relating to unlawful entry or stay in the United States. USSG, supra note 1, § 2L1.2.
96. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117.
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about USSG § 2L1.2. 97  The Sanchez-Juarez court held that this was
procedurally unreasonable:
[W]here a defendant has raised a nonfrivolous argument that the §
3553(a) factors warrant a below-Guidelines sentence and has ex-
pressly requested such a sentence, we must be able to discern from
the record that "the sentencing judge [did] not rest on the guidelines
alone, but ... consider[ed] whether the guidelines sentence actually
conforms, in the circumstances, to the statutory factors."
98
Under the rule in Sanchez-Juarez, an unexplained guideline sentence will
not substitute for the § 3553(a) analysis procedural reasonableness re-
quires whenever a party makes a nonfrivolous argument about one of the
§ 3553(a) factors.
99
The presumption of reasonableness for guideline sentences, there-
fore, does not apply to the procedural component of a sentence. 100 In-
stead, it applies only to the sentence's substantive (length) component.',
This restriction on the scope of presumptive reasonableness is an impor-
tant limitation on Booker minimalism because it ensures that district
courts consider all relevant § 3553(a) factors rather than just the Guide-
lines.
10 2
II. EVALUATING THE BOOKER MINIMALIST APPROACH
The Tenth Circuit's approach to reasonableness review is problem-
atic on two major grounds. The first is that Booker minimalism lacks
support in the language of either United States v. Booker10 3 or the sen-
97. Id. at 1112.
98. Id. at 1117 (quoting Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 676); cf Crosby, 397 F.3d at 115 ("[A]
sentencing judge would commit a statutory error in violation of section 3553(a) if the judge failed to
'consider' the applicable Guidelines range (or arguably applicable ranges) as well as the other fac-
tors listed in section 3553(a) ....").
99. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117; cf Richardson, 437 F.3d at 554 ("Where a defendant
raises a particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the record must reflect both that the district
judge considered the defendant's argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it.");
Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 675-76 ("[T]he sentencing judge may not rest on the guidelines alone, but
must, if asked by either party, consider whether the guidelines sentence actually conforms, in the
circumstances, to the statutory factors.").
100. See Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117; see also Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054 (noting a de novo
review for claims that "consider[] the district court's application" of the Guidelines or the other §
3553(a) factors).
101. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 1.
102. Note, however, that a party must argue the nonfrivolous § 3553(a) factor(s) at sentencing.
A failure to do so may mean that a district court's guideline sentence will be upheld even if the court
failed to make a formal § 3553(a) analysis. See United States v. Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d 1218, 1222
(10th Cir. 2006) ("We do not require a ritualistic incantation to establish consideration of a legal
issue, nor do we demand that the district court recite any magic words to show us that it fulfilled its
responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has instructed it to consider." (quoting
United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 2004))); see also United States v. Martinez,
455 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that a sentencing court need not "consider individu-
ally each factor listed in § 3553(a) before issuing a sentence"); United States v. Paredes, 461 F.3d
1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2006).
103. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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tencing statute. The second is that the court's Booker minimalism has
not accounted for the parsimony provision in § 3553(a), which requires
that every sentence be the lowest necessary to achieve a number of sen-
tencing goals.
The justifications the court has offered for its approach only par-
tially address these problems. That the Guidelines reflect the § 3553(a)
factors and represent a democratic influence in sentencing are justifica-
tions that inaccurately account for the nature of the Guidelines. The
court's assertion that Booker minimalism promotes sentencing uniform-
ity, however, represents a stronger (albeit imperfect) justification for a
guideline-centric approach.
A. Lack of Textual Support for Booker Minimalism
When Booker excised the mandatory sentencing provision from the
sentencing statute, 10 4 it left the Guidelines as only one of several
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. 10 5 The Tenth Circuit nevertheless contin-
ued to view the Guidelines as "not just one factor among many."'10 6 Part
I showed that the Guidelines retained a disproportionate weight in appel-
late review compared to the other § 3553(a) factors. 10 7
The Booker opinion provides little textual support for Booker mini-
malism.10 8  One could argue that it hinted at the approach when it in-
structed courts to "consider Guidelines ranges" and to "tailor the sen-
tence in light of other [§ 3553(a)] statutory concerns."' 0 9 This could be
construed as instructing courts to give the Guidelines a prominent
weight. Booker minimalism does require that courts "consider" the
Guidelines as a starting point before "tailoring" them with the other
§ 3553(a) factors."0 One problem with this interpretation is that it rests
on a single ambiguous phrase from the opinion. Moreover, interpreting
it this way appears to conflict with other parts of Booker that do not indi-
cate that any one factor has special weight."' For example, another part
of the same opinion observes that without the mandatory provision, the
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000).
105. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264.
106. United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 593 (10th Cir. 2006).
107. See discussion supra Part IA-B.
108. See, e.g., Stephen R. Sady, Guidelines Appeals: The Presumption of Reasonableness and
Reasonable Doubt, 18 FED SENT. R. 170 (2006) (noting that the Supreme Court's remedial opinion
in Booker "appears to specifically contemplate a reasonableness review unfettered by" Booker
minimalism and appellate review approaches such as presumptive reasonableness for guideline
sentences).
109. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46 (emphasis added).
110. See United States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006) ("The Guidelines
continue to be the 'starting point' for district courts and for this court's reasonableness review on
appeal."); Cage, 451 F.3d at 592 (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46); United States v. Andrews,
447 F.3d 806, 812 (10th Cir. 2006).
111. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 261 ("Section 3553(a) remains in effect, and sets forth
numerous factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts, as they
have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.").
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sentencing statute requires judges to "take account of the Guidelines to-
gether with other sentencing goals."
'"12
Nor does Booker minimalism follow from a plain reading of
§ 3553(a).1 3 The statute lists the Guidelines as the fourth of seven pri-
mary factors that a district court must consider when imposing a sen-
tence.' 4 It does not indicate a hierarchy among these factors" 5 or a pref-
erence for any."16 Along with Booker's silence about a minimalist ap-
proach, the sentencing statute's plain language provides critics with a
strong argument against Booker minimalism." 1
7
B. Lack of Consideration of the "Parsimony Provision"
Another problem with the Tenth Circuit's Booker minimalism is
that it has generally failed to address the "parsimony provision" in
§ 3553(a). The provision directs district courts to "impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary"" 8 to further policy goals in
§ 3553(a)(2)." 9 These goals include the need for a sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the crime, to deter future criminal conduct, to protect the
public from further crimes, and to provide the defendant with needed
treatment. 120 The Tenth Circuit has inadequately explored how its ap-
proach relates to the parsimony provision's requirement that sentences be
the lowest necessary to achieve these sentencing goals.'21
At times the court has appeared to confuse its appellate review for
reasonableness with a district court's obligation to impose a "sufficient,
but not greater than necessary" sentence. In United States v. Terrell,1
22
the court held that "just as we presume on appeal that a sentence within
the applicable guideline range is reasonable, so are district courts free to
112. Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000). The statute is reprinted supra note 9.
114. Id. § 3553(a)(4).
115. Id. § 3553(a); see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 304-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (noting
that the sentencing statute "provides no order of priority among all [the § 3553(a)] factors").
116. See Berman, supra note 90, at 143 ("Congress's nuanced sentencing instructions in §
3553(a) provide no textual basis for appellate courts to presume that all Guideline sentences are
reasonable.").
117. See id. at 142-44; Lamparello, supra note 12, at 174; Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra
Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, YALE L.J. POCKET PART, 137, 140 (2006),
http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/gertner.html.
118. § 3553(a) (emphasis added).
119. Id. § 3553(a)(2).
120. Id. In their entirety, the section's policy provisions detail the need for a sentence im-
posed:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to pro-
vide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner[.]
Id.
121. Id. § 3553(a).
122. 445 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2006).
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make the same presumption .... Booker, however, discussed rea-
sonableness in the context of appellate review of sentences, not in the
district courts' imposition of those sentences. 24 Reasonableness, and by
extension the presumption of reasonableness, are appellate rather than
sentencing devices. 125 A district court's responsibility under § 3553(a) is
not to impose a "reasonable" sentence, but to impose the lowest sentence
necessary to achieve the policy objectives in § 3553(a)(2). 126 Reason-
ableness is the standard by which the appellate court "judg[es] whether a
district court has accomplished [that] task." 127
The problem with the Tenth Circuit's confusion of the district and
appellate court roles is that it incorrectly tells district courts that a sen-
tence need only be "reasonable" rather than "sufficient, but not greater
than necessary." Shifting the district courts' focus to reasonableness can
lead to sentences that withstand appellate review for reasonableness but
nevertheless violate § 3553(a) because they are longer than necessary.
This problem is illustrated in United States v. Begay,'28 where the Tenth
Circuit noted that a district court "may impose a non-Guidelines sentence
if the sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a) warrant it, even if a Guide-
lines sentence might also be reasonable."'129 Under § 3553(a)'s parsi-
mony provision, however, the district court must impose the lower sen-
tence. 130  The sentencing statute does not allow the district court to
choose a sentence from within a range of reasonable sentences; rather, it
requires a specific sentence. That specific sentence is the one "sufficient,
but not greater than necessary," to meet the goals of the sentencing stat-
ute. The Tenth Circuit has therefore improperly extended the concept of
reasonableness from the appellate level to the district court level.
Conflicts between Booker minimalism and the parsimony provision
are likely to occur whenever there are circumstances unaccounted for by
the Guidelines 13' but properly considered under other § 3553(a) fac-
123. Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265 (emphasis added).
124. Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-61.
125. United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 740 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring); see
also United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 n.I (6th Cir. 2006) ("[A] district court's job is not
to impose a 'reasonable' sentence. Rather, a district court's mandate is to impose 'a sentence suffi-
cient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes' of section 3553(a)(2).").
126. § 3553(a); see also United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The
[sentencing] judge is not required-or indeed permitted-to 'presume' that a sentence within the
guidelines range is the correct sentence .... All he has to do is consider the guidelines and make
sure that the sentence he gives is within the statutory range and consistent with the sentencing factors
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." (internal citations omitted)).
127. Buchanan, 449 F.3d at 740 (Sutton, J., concurring) (quoting Foreman, 436 F.3d at 644
n.1).
128. 470 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 2006).
129. Begay, 470 F.3d at 975-76 (emphasis added).
130. See United States v. Ministro-Tapia, 470 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[f]f a district
court were explicitly to conclude that two sentences equally served the statutory purpose of § 3553,
it could not, consistent with the parsimony clause, impose the higher.").
131. The Guidelines acknowledge that they fail to account for a number of possibly mitigating
"offender characteristics" that are properly considered under § 3553(a), such as a defendant's age,
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tors.132 The court has held that the Guidelines are "not just one factor
among many,"'' 33 and that they have a "heavy weight" in sentencing and
in appellate review.134 Yet it is unclear how or even whether the Guide-
lines account for a district court's primary § 3553(a) responsibility of
imposing a "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" sentence.
135
When there are mitigating circumstances present for which the Guide-
lines do not account, the "heavy weight" given to Guidelines may there-
fore result in a district court wrongly giving a sentence that is greater
than necessary.
The Tenth Circuit has also apparently failed to explore how the par-
simony provision specifically bears on its appellate review for reason-
ableness. A search of reported Tenth Circuit cases following Booker
shows that the court has rarely referenced the parsimony provision, ex-
cept when reprinting it as part of § 3553(a).1 36 Only in United States v.
Cage137 did the court discuss the parsimony provision as part of a district
court's sentencing responsibility. 138  Even then, though, the reference
was in passing and did not explore how the provision might relate to the
Guidelines. 139 Not knowing how the Guidelines relate to the parsimony
provision but nevertheless giving the Guidelines "heavy weight" impairs
the appellate court's judgment about the reasonableness or unreasonable-
ness of a district court's determination that a particular sentence was
"sufficient, but not greater than necessary."
This apparent failure to explore the relationship between the Guide-
lines and the parsimony provision is a result of the Tenth Circuit's
Booker minimalist approach. By endorsing presumptive reasonableness
and proportionality, the Tenth Circuit gave the Guidelines an important
weight in determining the reasonableness (or unreasonableness) of dis-
trict court sentences. 140  Yet it appears that in some instances the ap-
proach may incorrectly associate reasonableness with the guideline
educational skills, mental or physical condition, or family ties. See USSG, supra note 1, § 5Hl.1-
1.6; see also discussion infra Part I.C. 1.
132. A number of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors permit broad inquiry into the defendant's
characteristics. See, e.g., § 3553(a)(1) (instructing the district court to consider "the history and
characteristics of the defendant" when sentencing that defendant).
133. Cage, 451 F.3d at 593.
134. Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1264.
135. The USSC has also not addressed this issue. See Berman, supra note 90, at 143 ("The
central command of § 3553(a) directs sentencing courts to 'impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes' of punishment .... The U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission has never fully explored-nor even formally addressed-whether the Guidelines serve this
mandate.").
136. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 415 F.3d 1234, 1249 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Resendiz-Patino, 420 F.3d 1177, 1184 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Valtierra-Rojas, 468
F.3d 1235, 1238 n.5 (10th Cir. 2006).
137. 451 F.3d 585 (10th Cir. 2006).
138. Cage, 451 F.3d at 588.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055; Cage, 451 F.3d at 593.
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range, possibly pushing district courts to impose sentences longer than
necessary.
C. Evaluating the Tenth Circuit's Justifications for Booker Minimalism
The justifications that the court has offered for its Booker minimal-
ism address the problems outlined above to varying degrees. As dis-
cussed previously, the Tenth Circuit has asserted that the Guidelines: (1)
reflect the other § 3553(a) factors, 141 (2) reflect a democratic influence in
sentencing, 42 and (3) promote sentencing uniformity.143 Implicit in these
justifications is that while Booker and § 3553(a) may not explicitly en-
dorse Booker minimalism, the Guidelines nevertheless have a unique
status among the § 3553(a) factors that justifies giving them special
weight.
1. The Guidelines Reflect the § 3553(a) Factors
The Tenth Circuit has asserted that the Guidelines are "generally an
accurate application of the factors listed in § 3553(a)."' 44 The Guidelines
are the product of "careful consideration" by an expert body-the
USSC-weighing and applying the sentencing factors "in a variety of
situations." 145 As such, the court has said, they merit special weight in
appellate review for reasonableness. 1
46
When sentencing a defendant, a district court takes into account two
types of considerations: "offense conduct" and "offender characteris-
tics. ' 147 Offense conduct relates to a defendant's actions on a particular
occasion: the type of crime committed, the harm that occurred, the
weapon used, the size of the financial loss, etc. 148 Offender characteris-
tics relate to a defendant's history or personal circumstances and can
include criminal history, employment status, physical or mental condi-
tion, or family and community ties.
149
141. Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265.
142. Cage, 451 F.3d at 593.
143. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054.
144. Cage, 451 F.3d at 594 (citing Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265). This justification is not unique
to the Tenth Circuit. See also Buchanan, 449 F.3d at 735 (Sutton, J., concurring) ("[T]he guidelines
remain the one § 3553(a) factor that accounts for all § 3553(a) factors.").
145. Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1265. The USSC also views the Guidelines as reflecting the other
§ 3553(a) factors. See Statement of the Honorable Ricardo H. Hinojosa (United States Sentencing
Commission Chairman) before the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Secu-
rity, February 10, 2005, at 4, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/hinojosa02l005.pdf
("[T]he factors the Sentencing Commission has been required to consider in developing the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines are a virtual mirror image of the factors sentencing courts are required to consider
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the Booker decision.").
146. Cage, 451 F.3d at 594.
147. Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in
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The Guidelines tend to focus on offense conduct 150 while simulta-
neously restricting consideration of offender characteristics.' 51 Section 2
of the Guidelines, devoted entirely to offense conduct, 52 requires district
courts to determine how numerous aspects of offense conduct correspond
to forty-three possible "offense levels."'' 53 At the same time, the Guide-
lines indicate that a number of offender characteristics are "not ordinarily
relevant" to a guideline range calculation. 54 These "not ordinarily rele-
vant" characteristics include: age (§ 5Hl.1); education and vocational
skills (§ 5H1.2); mental and emotional conditions (§ 5H1.3); physical
condition (§ 5H1.4); employment record (§ 5H1.5); family ties and re-
sponsibilities (§ 5H1.6); previous military, public, or charitable service
(§ 5H1. 11); and lack of guidance as a youth (§ 5H1.12).' 55 Interestingly,
the primary exception to the Guidelines' general exclusion of offender
characteristics is a defendant's criminal history, an aggravating factor
that when combined with the relevant offense level yields the guideline
sentencing range.156
While these offender characteristics may not be "ordinarily rele-
vant" to a guideline range calculation, they are always relevant to a sen-
tencing determination. The sentencing statute requires a district court to
"consider ... the history and characteristics of the defendant" when de-
termining a sentence.1 57 Yet as reviewed above, § 5H of the Guidelines
declares that much of this history and many of these characteristics are
"not ordinarily relevant" to a guideline calculation. 58
The Tenth Circuit's assertion that the Guidelines reflect the other
§ 3553(a) factors is therefore problematic because the Guidelines spe-
cifically exclude many offender characteristics relevant to a § 3553(a)
sentencing inquiry.1 59 By extension, the court's guideline-centric meth-
ods of reasonableness review (including the presumption of reasonable-
ness and proportionality) are also problematic whenever there are of-
fender characteristics unaccounted for by the Guidelines.
60
150. Id. at 282.
151. See id; Bowman, supra note 12, at 1347.
152. USSG, supra note 1, § 2.
153. Berman, supra note 147, at 282.
154. USSG, supra note 1, § 5H (introductory commentary).
155. Id. § 5H1.1-1.12; see also United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 986 (E.D. Wis.
2005) (identifying these and other characteristics not taken into account by the Guidelines).
156. Bowman, supra note 12, at 1324; Berman, supra note 147, at 283.
157. § 3553(a)(1).
158. USSG, supra note 1, § 5H (introductory commentary).
159. See Jason Hemandez, Presumptions of Reasonableness for Guideline Sentences After
Booker, 18 FED SENT. R. 252 (2006) ("[T]he section 3553(a) factors . .. tend to favor mitigating
circumstances due to restrictions on mitigating factors found in the Guidelines.").
160. See discussion infra Part V.A.
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The Tenth Circuit has implicitly recognized that the Guidelines im-
perfectly reflect the other § 3553(a) factors.1 61  In United States v.
Cage,162 for example, the district court justified a variance by citing a
number of mitigating offender characteristics, including the defendant's
educational level, work history, and extenuating family circumstances.
63
Section 5H of the Guidelines specifically excludes "education or voca-
tional skills," "employment record," and "family ties and responsibili-
ties ' from the guideline calculation. 64 Yet § 3553(a)(1) required the
district court to consider these circumstances when sentencing because
they related to the defendant's "history" and "characteristics.' '65 Cage
recognized this, observing that although the district court erred in the
weight it had given these factors, that they had been properly considered
under § 3553(a) was "beyond doubt."'166 In another case, United States v.
Mares,167 the court noted that a defendant's health problems could be
considered personal "history and characteristics" relevant under §
3553(a)( 1).168 The Guidelines, however, specifically exclude physical
condition from the guideline calculation.
169
The court's assertion that the Guidelines accurately reflect the other
§ 3553(a) factors is therefore flawed. They may generally reflect the
factors relating to offense conduct, but they specifically exclude numer-
ous offender characteristics relevant under § 3553(a).17
0
2. The Guidelines Reflect a Democratic Influence
The Tenth Circuit has also argued that the Guidelines are unique
because they reflect a democratic influence in sentencing. 17  According
to the court, Congress directed the USSC to promulgate the Guidelines
so that sentencing discretion would "be limited by the decisions of a pub-
licly accountable body.' 72  Because the Guidelines represent this "ex-
pression of popular political will," they deserve a special place among
the § 3553(a) factors.
173
161. Congress explicitly recognized this, having noted the need to "maintain[] sufficient flexi-
bility to permit individualized sentences" whenever warranted "by mitigating or aggravating factors
not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices." 28 U.S.C. §
991(b)(1)(B) (2000).
162. 451 F.3d 585 (10th Cir. 2006). This case was discussed supra Part I.B.
163. Cage, 451 F.3d at 595.
164. USSG, supra note 1, § 5H1.2, § 5H1.5, § 5H1.6.
165. § 3553(a)(1) says that a sentencing court "shall consider" the "history and characteristics
of a defendant" when imposing a sentence. § 3553(a)(1).
166. Cage, 451 F.3d at 595.
167. 441 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2006).
168. Mares, 441 F.3d at 1161.
169. USSG, supra note 1, § 5H1.4.
170. Berman, supra note 147, at 282.
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One problem with this justification is how it conceives of the
USSC. The Commission was originally intended to be "a body of ex-
perts ... insulat[ed] from the distorting pressures of politics" rather than
a reflection of politics. 174 From this insulated position, the USSC was to
fashion the Guidelines to meet the "purposes of sentencing as set forth in
[§ 3553(a)(2).]' ' 175 The USSC has, however, come under the influence of
"popular political will" in a way that some have argued is detrimental.
Over the years, the "power to make and influence sentencing rules has
migrated... from the U.S. Sentencing Commission... toward political
actors in Congress and [the Department of Justice].' 7 6
The USSC's ability to independently fashion the Guidelines in ac-
cordance with its Congressional mandate has therefore been weak-
ened. 177  Furthermore, those external political forces tend to be "uni-
formly aligned in one direction-that of increasing penalties.' 78  In
some cases this brings the political influences in conflict with the policy
objectives in § 3553(a)(2), which require judges to adjust sentences in
light of a defendant's individual circumstances. 
179
The court's argument that the Guidelines deserve a special weight
because they reflect a democratic influence in sentencing is therefore
also problematic.
3. The Guidelines Promote Uniformity
Finally, the court has justified its Booker minimalism by arguing
that the Guidelines promote sentencing uniformity. 80 Though imperfect,
this justification does provide the court with a compelling basis for its
guideline-centric approach.
The strength of the uniformity justification is in the origin of the
sentencing statute and the Guidelines. After over a decade of debate
about disparity in sentencing, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform
Act as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.81 The
174. Bowman, supra note 12, at 1324 (internal citations omitted).
175. § 991(b)(1)(A). These are the same purposes in sentencing that judges are required to
consider when imposing a sentence-i.e., the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to deter future criminal conduct, to protect the public from further crimes, and to provide the
defendant with needed treatment. § 3553(a)(2).
176. Bowman, supra note 12, at 1319; see also Frank 0. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a
Time Machine: The Political Science of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236
(2005); Amy Baron-Evans, The Continuing Struggle for Just, Effective and Constitutional Sentenc-
ing After United States v. Booker: Why and How the Guidelines Do Not Comply With § 3553(a), 30
CHAMPION 32, 35-36 (2006) (noting, among other things, that the Department of Justice and other
law enforcement agencies "are allowed to communicate with the [USSC] in secret").
177. Bowman, supra note 12, at 1340-42 (discussing both the Justice Department's "decreas-
ing deference" to the USSC as well as Congressional usurpation of the USSC's role).
178. Id. at 1345.
179. See § 3553(a)(2), reprinted supra note 9.
180. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054; Cage, 451 F.3d at 593.
181. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION 1 (2005) [hereinafter USSC OVERVIEW], available at
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legislation established the USSC and charged it with promulgating the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 8 2  In doing so, Congress intended pri-
marily to structure the previously "unfettered sentencing discretion ac-
corded to federal trial judges" so as to achieve more uniformity and cer-
tainty in sentencing. 8 3  Congress specifically instructed the USSC to
draft Guidelines to avoid "unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
criminal conduct.. ,,1 84
Some have argued, however, that the inconspicuous placement of
sentencing uniformity among the § 3553(a) factors 85 means that the
Guidelines should be weighted as "only one of seven distinct sentencing
considerations."'' 86  The difficulty with this argument is that does not
account for the primary historical motivation of the sentencing statute,
which was promoting sentencing uniformity.1 87 Booker itself explicitly
acknowledged that "Congress' basic goal in passing the Sentencing Act
was to move the sentencing system in the direction of increased uniform-
ity.' 88 Indeed, the importance Congress placed on the Guidelines fur-
thering uniformity was evidenced by the pre-Booker requirement that
that judges impose guideline sentences in most circumstances.
89
The goal of uniformity cannot justify the types of Sixth Amendment
violations that Booker prohibited. 90 Yet Booker was clear that "the ap-
plication of a 'reasonableness standard' was intended to .. .[achieve]
'honesty,' 'uniformity,' and 'proportionality' in sentencing, and to help
in avoiding 'excessive sentencing disparities."" 91  The Guidelines are
uniquely capable of promoting these goals. 92  Even critics of Booker
minimalism acknowledge that the Guidelines "can help frame, inform,
http://www.ussc.gov/generaVUSSCoverview_2005.pdf. For a more detailed review of how the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines came to be enacted, see Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of
Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 223 (1993).
182. USSC OVERVIEW, supra note 181, at 1.
183. Id. at 1-2; see also Bowman, supra note 12, at 1324 (indicating that one of Congress's
intentions in creating the USSC was drafting a "rationalized federal criminal code"). One prominent
proponent of the Sentencing Reform Act was federal judge Marvin Frankel, who had described the
prior discretionary sentencing system as being "at war with such concepts... as equality, objectiv-
ity, and consistency in the law." MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT
ORDER 10 (1973).
184. § 991(b)(l)(B).
185. § 3553 (a)(6).
186. Berman, supra note 17, at 421-22.
187. See supra note 184.
188. Booker, 543 U.S. at 253.
189. 18 U.S.C. 3553(b)(1) (2000). Booker excised this provision. 543 U.S. at 245.
190. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 263 ("We cannot and do not claim that use of a 'reasonableness'
standard will provide the uniformity that Congress originally sought to secure.").
191. United States v. Maloney, 466 F.3d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at
264); see also Bowman, supra note 12, at 1322 (outlining Congress's motivations in reforming the
sentencing system).
192. Maloney, 466 F.3d at 668 (noting that the Guidelines serve as "a benchmark" in reason-
ableness review). See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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and regularize the exercise of reasoned judgment by different sentencing
judges."'193  The numerous considerations, tables, and calculations pro-
vide an important means of achieving the sentencing uniformity that
Congress envisioned. 1
94
The Guidelines thus provide a mechanism for achieving uniformity.
The mechanism, though, may not always be perfect.' 95  As detailed
above, in many instances a guideline range will fail to reflect important
offender characteristics. 96  Yet by providing a calculated and uniform
numerical measure in the guideline ranges, the Guidelines have an im-
portant role in furthering Congress's original goals. This important role
justifies a prominent place for the Guidelines in appellate review.
Part V presents a standard of reasonableness review that accounts
for the strength of the Guidelines as well as their weaknesses.
III. BOOKER MINIMALISM IN THE OTHER CIRCUITS
Guideline-centric Booker minimalism likely originated in the Tenth
Circuit. The day after the Supreme Court handed down United States v.
Booker,'97 a United States District Court Judge in Utah, Paul Cassell,
articulated a strong argument for Booker minimalism. 98 The need for
sentencing uniformity justified giving the Guidelines heavy weight,
Judge Cassell argued, and variances should occur only "in unusual cases
for clearly identified and persuasive reasons."' 199 This Booker minimal-
ism viewed Booker as having made only a "modest adjustment" to the
Guidelines' role.2 °° While no longer mandatory, the Guidelines would
nevertheless continue to have a disproportionate weight in sentencing.20'
193. Berman, supra note 90, at 144.
194. See United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 924 (D. Utah 2005) ("The only way of
avoiding gross disparities in sentencing from judge-to-judge and district-to-district is for sentencing
courts to apply some uniform measure in all cases. The only standard currently available is the
Sentencing Guidelines."); see also Buchanan, 449 F.3d at 738 (Sutton, J., concurring) ("Where else,
at any rate, would a court of appeals start in measuring the reasonableness of a sentence?"); United
States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc) ("To construct a reasonable
sentence starting from scratch in every case would defeat any chance at rough equality which re-
mains a congressional objective.").
195. Some have questioned how effective the Guidelines are at achieving uniformity. See
generally Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85 (2006).
196. See discussion supra Part II.C. 1.
197. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
198. United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005). See DEMLErrNER ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 56 ("Leading sentencing judges were quick to see the importance of illuminating
the relevance of the guidelines in a post-Booker world. Within 24 hours of the Booker ruling, U.S.
District Judge Paul Cassell ... had issued a long opinion on exactly this point."). The Tenth Circuit
endorsed Wilson and has incorporated it into its argument for Booker minimalism. See United States
v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 593 (10th Cir. 2006).
199. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
200. McConnell, supra note 15, at 666-67.
201. Id. at 667; Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
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Booker minimalism was not universal, though, and a number of
other district courts quickly rejected it.20 2 In doing so, they argued that
Booker significantly changed the role of the Guidelines and had dramati-
cally increased judges' sentencing discretion.20 3 Under this Booker
maximalist approach, the Guidelines were "just one of a number of sen-
tencing factors.,
20 4
By the summer of 2005, Booker minimalism had moved to the ap-
pellate level as several circuits held that guideline sentences were pre-
sumptively reasonable on appeal.20 5 Some circuits declined to endorse
this presumption out of concern that it might conflict with the
§ 3553(a) sentencing analysis that Booker mandated.20 6 Other differ-
ences among the circuits arose as some adopted proportionality when
reviewing non-guideline sentences, holding that "the farther the judge's
sentence departs from the guidelines... the more compelling the justifi-
cation based on factors in section 3553(a)" must be.207
At first, these circuit splits appeared to highlight very different ap-
proaches to reasonableness review. 20 8 However, an examination of the
relevant case law in the two years since Booker reveals that these differ-
ences among the circuits tended to be more superficial than substan-
tive.20 9  Booker maximalism did not move to the appellate level as
Booker minimalism had. Indeed, all of the circuits eventually adopted a
Booker minimalist approach to reasonableness review that gave the
Guidelines special weight among the § 3553(a) factors. 210  Whether a
circuit adopted presumptive reasonableness or proportionality was there-
fore less significant than might otherwise seem since the Guidelines re-
mained prominent in appellate review.211
202. See, e.g., United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 985-86 (E.D. Wis. 2005); Simon
v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40 (D.N.Y. 2005).
203. McConnell, supra note 15, at 666 (describing how, under Booker maximalism, "district
courts are liberated to sentence criminal defendants in accordance with the judge's sense of individu-
alized justice, with the Guidelines merely taken into 'consideration' for what they are worth").
204. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 985; see also Simon, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
205. Sady, supra note 108, at 170 (citing United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th
Cir. 2005) and United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005) as among the first cases
endorsing presumptive reasonableness).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc); see
also United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2005).
207. United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005); cf United States v. Rattoballi,
452 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[W]e note that several other circuits have endorsed a rule that
requires district courts to offer a more compelling accounting the farther a sentence deviates from
the advisory Guidelines range .... [W]e have yet to adopt this standard as a rule in this circuit, and
do not do so here.").
208. See, e.g., DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 18, at 65.
209. See discussion infra Part IlI.A-C. Note that while circuit courts may have adopted
Booker minimalism, not all district courts have done so. Some weigh the Guidelines the same as
any other § 3553(a) factor. See, e.g., Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 986; Simon, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
210. See discussion infra Part III.A-C.
211. Part IV explores how this relates to the particular issues that the Supreme Court will
consider this spring.
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A. Reasonableness Review and the Presumption of Reasonableness
The clearest indicator of a court's Booker minimalist approach to
appellate review is its presumption of reasonableness for guideline sen-
212tences. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits
all endorse this presumption of reasonableness. 213  In these circuits, a
party challenging a guideline sentence must rebut the presumption of
214reasonableness in light of other § 3553(a) factors. 1  While the presump-
tion can function differently among these circuits,21 5 in all of them the
presumption gives the Guidelines a disproportionate weight compared to
the other sentencing factors.216
Five of the circuit courts-the First, Second, Third, Ninth, and
Eleventh-have declined to adopt this presumption of reasonableness for
guideline sentences, finding it "[un]helpful to talk about the guidelines as
'presumptively' controlling. 217  Though they formally reject the pre-
sumption, these courts tend to exhibit the same type of guideline-centric
Booker minimalism as those circuits that endorse it. For example, in all
circuits the Guidelines are the threshold consideration in sentencing as
well as in appellate review for reasonableness. 21 8 Furthermore, the cir-
cuits declining to endorse presumptive reasonableness nevertheless tend
to equate reasonableness with the Guidelines. The Second Circuit has
observed that "in the overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines sen-
tence . . . would be reasonable in the particular circumstances. 219 Simi-
212. See discussion supra Part I.A.
213. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Alonzo, 435
F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716 (8th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006).
214. See, e.g., Alonzo, 435 F.3d at 554; Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d at 608; Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055.
215. See discussion about the different meanings of presumptive reasonableness infra Part
IV.B. 1.
216. See, e.g., United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005); Cage, 451 F.3d at
593.
217. United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006); 440 F.3d at 518; see
also United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2005); 397 F.3d at 115; United States v.
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329-30 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Zavala, 443 F.3d 1165, 1168-70 (9th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 787 (11 th Cir. 2005).
218. See, e.g., Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 518 ("[T]he district court will have to calculate the
applicable guidelines range ... before deciding whether to exercise its ... discretion to impose a
non-guidelines sentence. (emphasis added)); Cooper, 437 F.3d at 331 ("[The Guidelines] provide a
natural starting point for the determination of the appropriate level of punishment for criminal con-
duct."); United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[The] guideline range remains
the starting point for the sentencing decision."); United States v. Vargas-Garcia, 434 F.3d 345, 349
(5th Cir. 2005) ("[W]e must first consider the district court's calculation of the Guidelines before
turning to the broader reasonableness issues."); United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1279 (9th
Cir. 2006) (explaining that the first step in a reasonableness review is determining whether the
sentencing court correctly calculated the guideline range); United States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261,
1264 (10th Cir. 2006) ("The Guidelines continue to be the starting point.., for this court's reason-
ableness review on appeal."); United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11 th Cir. 2005) ("First, the
district court must consult the Guidelines and correctly calculate the range provided by the Guide-
lines.").
219. United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
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larly, the Third Circuit has held that a guideline sentence is "more likely
to be reasonable than one outside the guidelines range., 220 According to
the Ninth Circuit, "it is very likely that a Guideline calculation will yield
a site within the borders of reasonable sentencing territory. '221 And the
Eleventh Circuit has said that it would ordinarily "expect a sentence
within the Guidelines range to be reasonable.
'" 222
One prominent critic of Booker minimalism has argued that "nearly
all circuit court decisions are focused excessively on the guidelines when
judging reasonableness. '223  The special weight the circuits give the
Guidelines in relation to the other § 3553(a) factors is also reflected in
how they describe the Guidelines. For example, the First Circuit-which
has rejected presumptive reasonableness-has held that "the Guidelines
are more than just 'another [§ 3553(a)] factor.' '224 The Second Circuit,
another court rejecting presumptive reasonableness, describes the Guide-
lines as not "just 'another factor' in the statutory list. '225 This language
is strikingly similar to that of the Tenth Circuit, which has adopted pre-
sumptive reasonableness and has described the Guidelines as "not just
one factor among many., 226 In language and in use, therefore, all of the
circuits implement the Guidelines in much the same way.
B. Non-Guideline Sentences: Proportionality and Unreasonableness
Examining how circuits review non-guideline sentences for reason-
ableness provides more evidence of the prominence of Booker minimal-
ism. One method of reviewing these sentences is proportionality. Under
proportionality, "the farther the judge's sentence departs from the guide-
lines ... the more compelling the justification based on factors in section
3553(a)" must be.227
Not surprisingly, all of the circuits that have adopted presumptive
reasonableness for guideline sentences also evaluate non-guideline sen-
tences using proportionality.2
220. United States v. Lloyd, 469 F.3d 319, 321-22 (3d Cir. 2006) (upholding a district court's
sentence when the sentencing judge indicated that "the guideline range is the thing that I should be
looking to primarily").
221. Zavala, 443 F.3dat 1170.
222. Talley, 431 F.3d at 787.
223. Sentencing Law and Policy Blog, http://sentencing.typepad.com/ (Aug. 22, 2006,
8:57AM).
224. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 518. While the Jimenez-Beltre court justified its special
reliance on the Guidelines as "the only integration of the multiple factors," it emphasized that by
themselves the Guidelines are inadequate. Id.
225. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 133.
226. Cage, 451 F.3d at 593.
227. Dean, 414 F.3d at 729.
228. United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cit. 2006); United States v. Duhon,
440 F.3d 711, 715 (5th Cit. 2006); United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491, 495-497 (6th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029,
1033 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 594 (10th Cir. 2006).
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Significantly, two circuits that have formally rejected presumptive
reasonableness have nevertheless adopted proportionality. The First
Circuit has held that the farther a sentence varies from the guideline
range, "the more compelling the justification based on factors in section
3553(a)" must be. 229 The Eleventh Circuit has also held that "an extraor-
dinary reduction" from the guideline range "must be supported by ex-
traordinary circumstances. ' '230 More circuits have therefore adopted pro-
portionality than have adopted presumptive reasonableness.
Only the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have declined to for-
mally adopt either method of reasonableness review. However, even
these circuits use the Guidelines in a similar way to those endorsing pro-
portionality-i.e., as an important metric in evaluating the reasonable-
ness of a non-guideline sentence. For example, in United States v. Rat-
toballi,231 the Second Circuit expressly declined to adopt proportional-
ity232 but emphasized the special weight of the Guidelines and their role
"in calibrating the review for reasonableness."233  These circuits, like
those that use proportionality, closely examine a district court's variance
from the Guidelines by evaluating the "statement of reasons (or lack
thereof) for the sentence that it elect[ed] to impose. 234
The Guidelines thus have a central role in measuring reasonableness
in virtually all appellate review of district court sentencing.
C. Booker Minimalism and Post-Booker Sentencing Statistics
The Guidelines' place in appellate review among the circuits raises
an important issue in light of Booker's holding that mandatory Guide-
lines violate the Sixth Amendment.235 Per se unreasonableness for non-
guideline sentences would be constitutionally problematic under
Booker.2 36 Yet the circuits' treatment of the Guidelines may render them
outcome-determinative, an essentially mandatory regime indistinguish-
able from the one Booker struck down.
229. United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing the Seventh Circuit's Dean,
414 F.3d at 729).
230. United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1236-37 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v.
McVay, 447 F.3d 1348, 1357 (11 th Cir. 2006)).
231. 452 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2006).
232. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 134 ("[W]e have yet to adopt this [proportionality] standard as a
rule in this circuit, and do not do so here.").
233. Id. at 133; see also United States v. Ministro-Tapia, 470 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2006)
(noting that the Guidelines are to be used as the "benchmark" when considering a sentence).
234. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 134; cf Mares, 402 F.3d at 519 ("[W]hen the judge elects to give
a non-Guideline sentence, she should carefully articulate the reasons she concludes that the sentence
she has selected is appropriate for that defendant. These reasons should be fact specific .....
235. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226-27.
236. Id. at 311 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) ("[A]ny system which held it per se unreasonable
(and hence reversible) for a sentencing judge to reject the Guidelines is indistinguishable from the
mandatory Guidelines system that the Court today holds unconstitutional.").
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One concern expressed about the presumption of reasonableness
and proportionality is the message that they send to district courts.
While § 3553(a) obligates district courts to impose a sentence "sufficient,
but not greater than necessary, '2 37 these popular appellate methods of
reasonableness review may have the effect of discouraging non-guideline
238sentences. As we have seen, however, even those circuits rejecting
presumptive reasonableness or proportionality tend to focus their appel-
late review around the Guidelines. According to critics, the atmosphere
of appellate review among every circuit "encourage[es] the sort of rote,
mechanistic reliance on the Guidelines that [the Booker substantive]
opinion found constitutionally problematic.,
239
Sentencing statistics bolster arguments that Booker failed to "radi-
cally transform[] essential federal sentencing dynamics" and that "post-
Booker sentencing may not be too different from pre-Booker sentenc-
ing." 240 In March 2006, the USSC issued a report about the impact of
Booker on federal sentencing.24' The report concluded that "Booker has
not radically altered many central features of the federal sentencing sys-
tem: Guideline calculations based on judicial fact-finding, and within-
guideline sentencing outcomes, remain the norm. 242  When guideline
sentences were combined with below-range sentences sponsored by the
Government, they equaled approximately 86 percent of all sentences.
243
One particularly telling statistic is that since Booker, only one court has
vacated a guideline sentence for substantive unreasonableness. 2 " The
rarity of such a holding reflects the prominence of the Guidelines among
circuit courts.
237. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
238. United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 740 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring) ("If
I have one anxiety about the presumption [of reasonableness], it is the risk that it will cast a discour-
aging shadow on trial judges who otherwise would grant variances in exercising their independent
judgment.").
239. Berman, supra note 90, at 143.
240. Douglas A. Berman, Assessing Federal Sentencing After Booker, 17 FED. SENT. R. 291,
291-92 (2005); see also Gertner, supra note 11.7, at 140 (noting the similarities between pre-Booker
decisions and those in circuits that had adopted presumptive reasonableness); Frank 0. Bowman, III,
'Tis a Gift to be Simple: A Model Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 FED. SENT. R.
301 (2006) ("[T]he federal sentencing debate ... since Booker has mostly been about whether the
post-Booker guidelines are really any different from the pre-Booker guidelines." (citation omitted)).
241. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING, March 2006, [hereinafter USSC FINAL REPORT], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/bookerreport/Booker-Report.pdf.
242. Douglas A. Berman, Now What? The Post-Booker Challenge for Congress and the Sen-
tencing Commission, 18 Fed. Sent. R. 157 (2006); see also USSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 241, at
vi ("The majority of federal cases continue to be sentenced in conformance with the sentencing
guidelines.").
243. USSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 241, at 46; see also Statement of the Honorable Ricardo
H. Hinojosa before the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, March
16, 2006, at 6, available at http://www.ussc.gov/booker-report/031606Booker/ 2OTestimony.pdf.
Note that there are greater variances among district courts than among the circuits themselves. See
USSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 241, at 85-86.
244. United States v. Lazenby, 439 F. 3d 928, 934 (8th Cir. 2006).
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A review of case law and sentencing statistics therefore reveals that
Booker minimalism suffuses virtually all of appellate review.245 In every
circuit, guideline sentences "are accorded a greater degree of deference,
and engender far less scrutiny" than those outside of the Guidelines. 46
Differences between the circuits that have adopted presumptive reason-
ableness or proportionality and those that have not tend to be superficial
rather than substantive.
This case law and these statistics raise a question about what impact
it would have if the Supreme Court declares this spring that presumptive
reasonableness or proportionality are unconstitutional when even those
circuits not adopting them embrace guideline-centric Booker minimal-
ism.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FUTURE OF BOOKER MINIMALISM
The Supreme Court will address the presumption of reasonableness
and proportionality in two cases this spring. The cases have the potential
to widely impact reasonableness review in the circuit courts. Whether
they will have this impact, though, is uncertain.
A. Introduction: Rita, Claiborne, and the Tension and Competing Goals
of Sentencing
Congress created the USSC and charged it with establishing policies
in the federal sentencing system to address specific purposes.247 These
included the need for a sentence to reflect the seriousness of the crime, to
deter future criminal conduct, to protect the public from further crimes,
and to provide defendants with needed treatment.248 Congress intended
that the Guidelines would "provide certainty and fairness" in meeting
these purposes, and that they would "avoid[] unwarranted sentencing
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar criminal conduct.,
249
Congress also recognized the limitations of a structured sentencing
system. To meet its intended purposes, the system would also need to
"maintain[] sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences"
whenever warranted by circumstances unaccounted for by the Guide-
lines.25° Sentencing would also need to account for the parsimony provi-
sion at the heart of § 3553(a), which required district courts to impose the
245. See Eric Citron, Sentencing Review: Judgement, Justice, and the Judiciary, 115 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 150, 150 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/citron.html (noting that
despite the fact some circuits have nominally rejected presumptive reasonableness for Guidelines
sentences, "one can comb through mountains of case law from any circuit before finding a guideline
sentence reversed as unreasonable").
246. Lamparello, supra note 12, at 174.
247. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (2000).
248. Id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000)).
249. § 991(b)(1)(B).
250. Id.
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lowest sentence needed ("sufficient, but not greater than necessary") in
each case.2 1' Reaching this lowest sentence requires a district court to
consider how each defendant's unique "history and characteristics" relate
to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. 2
There is thus a tension in sentencing between the uniformity pro-
moted by the Guidelines on one side, and the exercise of independent
judicial discretion required by § 3553(a) and Booker on the other. The
popularity of the presumption of reasonableness and proportionality
among the circuit courts serves to highlight this tension.
The Supreme Court has chosen United States v. Rita and United
States v. Claiborne as the vehicles for addressing the proper balance be-
tween the Guidelines and the other § 3553(a) sentencing factors.253 Rita
asks whether Booker prohibits applying a presumption of reasonableness
to guideline sentences, and Claiborne asks whether Booker prohibits
254proportionality as a method of evaluating non-guideline sentences.
A closer examination of Rita and Claiborne raises questions about
how they might impact Booker minimalism as it exists in the circuit
courts. Part of the uncertainty stems from the unusual definition of pre-
sumptive reasonableness in Rita. Because the "presumption of reason-
ableness" in Rita functions differently than it does in most other circuits,
the Supreme Court could issue a narrow ruling that would preserve the
presumption as it exists in these other circuits.
Claiborne reflects a mainstream approach to proportionality, but it
too leaves questions about its impact. Part III detailed how circuit courts
have uniformly embraced Booker minimalism's guideline-centric ap-
proach. This is true even though only some have formally adopted pro-
portionality. This raises the question of what impact it would have if the
Court finds that proportionality violates Booker. How would this affect
circuits that have not formally endorsed it as a method of reasonableness
review but nevertheless employ a guideline-centric approach? A similar
question arises with Rita and presumptive reasonableness-i.e., if the
presumption is struck down, can courts nevertheless continue to give the
Guidelines disproportionate weight among the sentencing factors?
It is unclear to what extent Rita and Claiborne will address these
questions. The Supreme Court could choose to narrow the scope of its
rulings to promote unanimity on what has been a contentious issue.255 A
251. § 3553(a).
252. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
253. Miscellaneous Orders of the Court, supra note 2.
254. Id.
255. Chief Justice John Roberts has emphasized the importance of the Court deciding issues on
the "narrowest possible ground" so as to "promote[] clarity and guidance for... the lower courts."
Chief Justice John Roberts, Commencement Address at the Georgetown University Law Center
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narrow ruling, though, may portend an uncertain future for both Booker
minimalism and reasonableness review.
B. United States v. Rita and the Presumption of Reasonableness
The impact of Rita will depend on whether the Supreme Court
chooses to review the presumption of reasonableness as it relates only to
the procedural component of a sentence, or if the Court chooses to re-
view how it relates to the substantive component of a sentence as well.
This is an important distinction because it marks the difference between
an opinion that would have a broad effect and one that would have only a
limited effect.
1. Two Different Approaches to the Presumption of Reasonable-
ness
When reviewing district court sentences, the majority of circuits
have divided reasonableness into procedural and substantive compo-
nents.256 Procedural reasonableness asks whether the district court cor-
rectly calculated the applicable guideline range257 and whether it "con-
sidered the § 3553(a) factors and explained its reasoning" when imposing
a particular sentence. 258  Substantive reasonableness considers whether
the length of the sentence was reasonable in light of the facts of the case
and relevant § 3553(a) factors.
25 9
(May 21, 2006). The contentiousness of the issue is apparent in the fact that both the substantive and
remedial Booker opinions split 5-4. See McConnell, supra note 15, at 677-78.
256. Berman, supra note 90, at 143; D'Addio, supra note 12, at 177, 179; see also United
States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006) ("Reasonableness review involves both pro-
cedural and substantive components."); United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005)
(arguing that appellate courts must consider "not only the length of the sentence but also the factors
evaluated and the procedures employed by the district court in reaching its sentencing determina-
tion"); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 488 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[R]easonableness depends not
only on the length of the sentence but on the process by which it is imposed."); United States v.
Shannon, 414 F.3d 921, 923 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing procedural and substantive errors in sentenc-
ing); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he reasonableness standard
of review set forth in Booker necessarily encompasses both the reasonableness of the length of the
sentence, as well as the method by which the sentence was calculated.").
257. See, e.g., Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055.
258. United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 591 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054-55); see also United States v. Dexta, 470 F.3d 612, 614-15
(6th Cir. 2006) ("[A] sentence is procedurally reasonable if the record demonstrates that the sentenc-
ing court addressed the relevant factors in reaching its conclusion"). Circuits that have not adopted
presumptive reasonableness have also recognized that reasonableness has a procedural component.
See United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[A] sentencing judge would commit
a statutory error in violation of section 3553(a) if the judge failed to 'consider' the applicable Guide-
lines range (or arguably applicable ranges) as well as the other factors listed in section
3553(a) ...."); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2005) ("To determine if the
court acted reasonably in imposing the resulting sentence, we must first be satisfied the court exer-
cised its discretion by considering the relevant factors.").
259. See, e.g., United States v. Gale, 468 F.3d 929, 934 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting the substantive
component of reasonableness review relates to "the length of the sentence") (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted); Paladino, 401 F.3d at 488 (noting that one aspect of reasonableness is
"the length of the sentence"); United States v. Mateo, 471 F.3d 1162, 1166 (10th Cir. 2006) ("We
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As discussed in Part I, procedural reasonableness is a check on
Booker minimalism because in theory it prohibits courts from relying
solely on the Guidelines.260 An important part of procedural reasonable-
ness is "ensur[ing] that a sentencing court explains its reasoning to a suf-
ficient degree to allow for reasonable appellate review.",261 Section
3553(c) of the sentencing statute requires a district court "at the time of
sentencing" to "state in open court the reasons for the imposition of the
particular sentence., 262  The district court must therefore show that it
accounted for not only the Guidelines, but any other relevant § 3553(a)
factors raised by a defendant or by the government.263 A district court's
failure to address a nonfrivolous § 3553(a) argument renders the sentence
procedurally unreasonable and it should be vacated.26
In most circuits, the presumption of reasonableness does not attach
to the procedural component of a district court's sentence, even if that
sentence falls within the Guidelines.265 In fact, claims of procedural un-
determine substantive reasonableness by reference to the actual length of the sentence imposed in
relation to the sentencing factors enumerated in § 3553(a).").
260. See discussion supra Part I.D.
261. Dexta, 470 F.3d at 614.
262. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2000).
263. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he sen-
tencing judge may not rest on the guidelines alone, but must, if asked by either party, consider
whether the guidelines sentence actually conforms, in the circumstances, to the statutory factors.");
Steven L. Chanenson, Write On!, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 146, 146 (2006)
http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/chanenson.html ("[T]he sentencing judge must explain his
reasons, and meaningfully document how he grappled with the § 3553(a) factors to reach the sen-
tence imposed.").
264. Chanenson, supra note 263, at 148 ("[A] number of appellate panels have enforced the
statutory reasons requirement and reversed in cases in which the judge failed to provide a sufficient
explanation of the logic behind the sentence."); see also Moreland, 437 F.3d at 434 (holding that a
district court's sentence "may be procedurally unreasonable ... if the district court provides an
inadequate statement of reasons [under § 3553(a)]"); United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 554
(6th Cir. 2006) ("Where a defendant raises a particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the
record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendant's argument and that the
judge explained the basis for rejecting it."); Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 676 ("[T]he sentencing judge
may not rest on the guidelines alone, but must, if asked by either party, consider whether the guide-
lines sentence actually conforms, in the circumstances, to the statutory factors."); United States v.
Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1117 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[W]here a defendant has raised a nonfrivo-
Ious argument that the § 3553(a) factors warrant a below-Guidelines sentence.., we must be able to
discern from the record that the sentencing judge [did] not rest on the guidelines alone." (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). Circuits rejecting presumptive reasonableness have held the
same. See, e.g., Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329 ("[A] rote statement of the § 3553(a) factors should not
suffice if at sentencing either the defendant or the prosecution properly raises a ground of recognized
legal merit (provided it has a factual basis) and the court fails to address it." (citation and quotation
marks omitted)); United States v. Diaz-Arqueta, 447 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006) (reversing the
district court's sentence because it failed to consider relevant § 3553(a) factors). Note that despite
these strong authorities, sentencing statistics suggest that violations of procedural reasonableness are
not always reversed on such grounds. See discussion supra Part III.C; see also Comment Post of
Jeff Hurd to Sentencing Law and Policy Blog, http://sentencing.typepad.com/ (Jan. 20, 2007, 10:15
EST) and Response Post of Douglas Berman (Jan. 20, 2007, 10:15 EST) (noting that while many
circuits claim to reverse for procedural unreasonableness, sentencing statistics suggest they rarely
do).
265. See, e.g., Richardson. 437 F.3d at 554 (noting that the presumption of reasonableness
"does not relieve the sentencing court of its obligation to explain to the parties and the reviewing
court its reasons for imposing a particular sentence"); United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491,496 (6th
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reasonableness assert that the district court made a legal error, and as
such they are reviewed de novo on appeal.266 This is because while the
Guidelines might be an important factor in reasonableness review, "[a]
district court may not presume that they produce the 'correct' sen-
tence. 26 7 Booker itself indicated that part of reasonableness review re-
quires considering whether the district court accounted for relevant
§ 3553(a) factors: "Section 3553(a) remains in effect, and sets forth nu-
merous factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn will guide
appellate courts . . . in determining whether a sentence is unreason-
able.,,268
A district court's failure to indicate how it considered relevant
§ 3553(a) factors would leave the appellate court unable to determine
whether the district court weighted those factors reasonably or unrea-
sonably. 269 For this reason an appellate court may not presume the pro-
cedural reasonableness of a sentence simply because it falls within the
guideline range.2 7 ° Instead, the court must be able to determine clearly
from the record that the district court considered any relevant § 3553(a)
factors raised by a party.2 7'
That most appellate courts do not presume a guideline sentence is
procedurally reasonable means that the presumption applies only to the
substantive component of a sentence-i.e., its length.272  Indeed, it is
only after the appellate court is satisfied that the district court's sentence
was procedurally reasonable that the presumption of reasonableness or-
dinarily becomes relevant.273
Cir. 2006) (discussing the presumption of reasonableness in the context of substantive reasonable-
ness); Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 675-76; Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117.
266. See, e.g., Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054 (noting a de novo review for claims that "consider[] the
district court's application" of the Guidelines or the other § 3553(a) factors).
267. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); Cun-
ningham, 429 F.3d at 675-76.
268. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
269. See Chanenson, supra note 263, at 148 ("The key is to provide a window into the discre-
tionary sentencing process and to afford appellate courts something substantive to review.").
270. See, e.g., Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 679 ("[W]henever a district judge is required to make
a discretionary ruling that is subject to appellate review, we have to satisfy ourselves, before we can
conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion, that he exercised his discretion, that is, that he
considered the factors relevant to that exercise." (emphasis added)); Demaree, 459 F.3d at 794-95.
271. Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 679; Richardson, 437 F.3d at 554; Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at
1117.
272. Dexta, 470 F.3d at 614-15 (discussing the presumption of reasonableness in the context of
substantive reasonableness); Davis, 458 F.3d at 496 (discussing the presumption of reasonableness
in the context of substantive reasonableness); Cage, 451 F.3d at 591 (distinguishing procedural from
substantive reasonableness and discussing the presumption of reasonableness in a substantive con-
text); Mateo, 471 F.3d at 1166 ("We determine substantive reasonableness by reference to the actual
length of the sentence imposed in relation to the sentencing factors enumerated in § 3553(a).").
273. See, e.g., United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 734 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing the
presumption of reasonableness in the context of substantive reasonableness); Davis, 458 F.3d at 496
(discussing the presumption of reasonableness in the context of substantive reasonableness). Further
evidence for this comes in the fact that when the district court's error is procedural, courts do not
usually apply the presumption of reasonableness. See, e.g., Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 680 (vacating
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Significantly, not all circuits treat the presumption of reasonable-
ness this way. The Fifth Circuit in particular appears to have adopted a
more dramatic Booker minimalist approach to appellate review. Under
the Fifth Circuit's approach, a district court's guideline calculation en-
compasses both procedural and substantive reasonableness.274 If a sen-
tence falls within the guideline range, on appeal the court "infer[s] that
the [district court] has considered all the [§ 3553(a) sentencing] fac-
tors., 275 The district court's failure to address a defendant's specific and
non-frivolous § 3553(a) arguments for a variance would not necessarily
constitute procedural error.276 Instead, "[w]hen the judge exercises her
discretion to impose a sentence within the Guideline range and states for
the record that she is doing so, little explanation is required.,
277
The Fifth Circuit's application of presumptive reasonableness to
both procedural and substantive components of a sentence is unusual,
however, and other circuits have explicitly rejected it.278  That the ap-
proach exists, though, is significant in the Rita case.
2. United States v. Rita
Although United States v. Rita comes from the Fourth Circuit, it
represents the unusual type of presumptive reasonableness that conflates
the procedural and substantive components of a sentence. Under the
majority rule outlined in the previous section, the facts in Rita would in
theory have led most circuits to vacate the sentence as procedurally un-
reasonable.279 Interestingly, this means that they would have decided the
case without presumptive reasonableness ever being relevant.28°
In Rita, the court reviewed a defendant's appeal from a jury convic-
tion and sentence on charges of perjury, obstruction of justice, and mak-
ing false statements. 281 The district court had sentenced the defendant to
33-months' imprisonment, which was within the guideline range.282 On
the lower court's sentence but neither discussing presumptive reasonableness nor "express[ing] [any]
view on the proper sentence"); Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117 (failing to consider presumptive
reasonableness when the error was procedural).
274. United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Sam,
467 F.3d 857, 864 (5th Cir. 2006) ("When the district court imposes a sentence falling within a
properly calculated Guidelines range, that sentence is presumptively reasonable and 'little explana-
tion is required."' (quoting Mares, 402 F.3d at 519)).
275. Mares, 402 F.3d at 519.
276. See id.
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329-30 ("At least one court has held a sentencing judge is
presumed to have considered all of the § 3553(a) factors ifa sentence is imposed within the applica-
ble guidelines range. United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005). We decline to
follow this approach.").
279. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
280. This is because the presumption of reasonableness typically becomes relevant only after
the appellate court has determined that a district court's sentence was procedurally reasonable. See
discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
281. United States v. Rita, 177 Fed. Appx. 357, 358 (4th Cir. 2006).
282. Rita, 177 Fed. Appx. at 358.
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appeal, the Rita court noted that a guideline sentence was entitled to pre-
sumption of reasonableness.2 83 The court held that the district court
correctly calculated the guideline range, "consider[ed] the factors set
forth in § 3553(a)," and consequently affirmed.284
Despite the Rita court's assertion that the district court had "con-
sider[ed] the factors set forth in § 3553(a)," the record appeared to show
that it had not.2 85 Before sentencing, the defendant argued for a below-
guideline variance based on his military service record, various health
problems, that he did not represent a threat to the public, and that he
would be a "likely ... target" in prison for having worked as a law en-
forcement officer with the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service.286 Prior to imposing its sentence, however, the district court
noted only that it was "unable to find that the sentencing guideline range
•.. is an inappropriate guideline range [for the crimes] . . . and under
3553, certainly the public needs to be protected., 287 The record did not
reflect any consideration of the defendant's arguments based on his mili-
tary record, physical condition, or service as a law enforcement offi-
cer.
2 8 8
Each of the defendant's arguments for a mitigated sentence were
unaccounted for in the Guidelines and would be properly considered
under § 3553(a). The guideline policy statements indicate that the
Guidelines do not account for a defendant's physical condition
(§ 5H1.4), employment record (§ 5H1.5), or previous military service
(§ 5H1.11).219 Yet § 3553(a) says that these factors "shall" be considered
"in determining the particular sentence to be imposed ' 290 because they
relate to "the history and characteristics of the defendant., 291 Addition-
ally, the district court failed to address the defendant's argument that his
physical safety in prison would be jeopardized because he had been a law
enforcement officer. Under § 3553(a)(2)(D), however, the district court
must consider the need to provide the defendant with "correctional
treatment in the most effective manner. 2 92 As such, all of the defen-
dant's § 3553(a) arguments that the district court ignored were relevant
and nonfrivolous.
283. Id. (citing United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006)).
284. Id.
285. Brief for Petitioner at 48, Rita v. United States, No. 06-5754 (Dec. 18, 2006), available at
http://www.fpdmdnc.org/Rita/RitaMeritsBrief.Final.pdf.
286. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 13-16, Rita v. United States, No. 06-5754 (Dec. 18,
2006).
287. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 285, at 48.
288. Id.
289. USSG, supra note 1, § 5H1.4, § 5H1.5, § 5H1. 11.
290. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
291. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
292. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
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In asserting that the district court had "consider[ed] the factors set
forth in § 3553(a)" when the record appeared to reflect that it had not, the
Rita court conflated procedural and substantive reasonableness in a way
similar to that of the Fifth Circuit.293 Instead of vacating the sentence for
procedural unreasonableness, Rita "infer[red] that the [district court]
[had] considered all the [§ 3553(a) sentencing] factors" 294 simply be-
cause the sentence was a guideline sentence. Rita presumed that because
the sentence was a guideline sentence, it was both procedurally and sub-
stantively reasonable.
As detailed above, in most circuits a district court's failure to con-
sider a defendant's arguments about mitigating § 3553(a) factors would
render the sentence procedurally unreasonable.295 In fact, the Fourth
Circuit itself has stated this as well. In United States v. Moreland,296 the
court held that "[r]easonableness review involves both procedural and
substantive components," and a district court's sentence "may be proce-
durally unreasonable . .. if the district court provides an inadequate
statement of reasons [under § 3553(a)]. 297 Under the approach used by
most circuits-including the Fourth-the district court's sentence in Rita
should therefore have been reversed as procedurally unreasonable. 98
3. The Uncertain Effect of Rita
That the "presumption of reasonableness" in Rita means something
different than what it means in most circuits leaves a question about what
impact it would have if the Supreme Court were to rule that the presump-
tion violates Booker. According to the order list in Rita,299 the Court will
review three questions: (1) whether the district court's sentence was rea-
sonable, (2) whether Booker prohibits the presumption of reasonableness
for guideline sentences, and (3) whether the presumption can justify a
sentence unaccompanied by an explicit analysis of relevant § 3553(a)
factors.300 To affirm, the Supreme Court would have to find that a pre-
sumption of reasonableness can validly apply to both procedural (Ques-
tion 3) and substantive (Question 2) components of a sentence.
To vacate the sentence, however, the Court may-but need not-
decide the procedural and substantive questions. The facts in Rita would
allow the Court to remand the case on either (or both) of these issues.
293. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
294. Mares, 402 F.3d at 519.
295. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
296. 437 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2006).
297. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 434.
298. In theory these courts would have reversed on these facts. In practice, though, proce-
durally unreasonable sentences are sometimes affirmed even though they are procedurally unreason-
able. See supra note 264 (discussing how statistics seem to indicate that at least some procedurally
unreasonable sentences are nevertheless affirmed).
299. See Miscellaneous Orders of the Court, supra note 2.
300. Id.
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The Court could narrow the scope of its opinion by holding only that the
appellate court improperly applied the presumption of reasonableness to
the procedural component of the sentence. This would leave the ques-
tion of whether the presumption can apply to a sentence's substantive
component unanswered.
If the Court narrows its opinion in this way and holds only that Rita
erred in affirming the sentence because the district court did not consider
the defendant's § 3553(a) arguments, it would not represent a dramatic
departure from what most circuits already claim to be doing. Most cir-
cuits treat procedural reasonableness as a prerequisite to presumptive
reasonableness.30 1 Unlike in Rita, these circuits generally do not pre-
sume a sentence is procedurally reasonable simply because it falls within
the Guidelines. Only after the appellate court is satisfied that the district
court's sentence was procedurally reasonable does the presumption of
reasonableness become relevant-i.e., as it relates to the substantive
(length) component of the sentence.30 2 A decision striking down Rita on
narrow procedural reasonableness grounds would therefore leave the
majority of circuits exactly where they are currently.
At least one member of the Supreme Court has expressed a desire to
narrow the scope of the Court's rulings to promote unanimity on conten-
tious issues.30 3 A narrow opinion in Rita focused only on procedural
reasonableness may promote such unanimity within the Court, but it
would come at the price of a lost opportunity to clarify what role the
Guidelines should have in the substantive aspect of reasonableness re-
view. An opinion addressing how presumptive reasonableness applies
substantively to a sentence would have a much broader effect and would
assist courts in identifying the proper role of the Guidelines after Booker.
Part V proposes one approach to reasonableness review that ad-
dresses this substantive issue.
C. United States v. Claiborne and Proportionality
In the second Booker minimalism case to be decided this spring,
United States v. Claiborne,3° 4 the Supreme Court will review proportion-
ality and whether it is consistent with Booker to require that a district
court show extraordinary circumstances whenever its sentence substan-
tially varies from the Guidelines. 30 5 As detailed in Part III, all of the cir-
cuits except the Second, Third, and Ninth have adopted proportionality
as a part of their reasonableness review.30 6 The central issue that Clai-
301. See discussion supra Part 1V.B. 1.
302. Id.
303. Chief Justice John Roberts in particular has expressed this inclination. See supra note
255.
304. 439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006).
305. See Miscellaneous Orders of the Court, supra note 2.
306. See discussion supra Part III.B.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
borne presents is whether Booker permits an approach wherein the
Guidelines serve as the metric for determining if a sentence is unreason-
able.
As in Rita, the important question in Claiborne is how the Supreme
Court addresses the issue before it. Depending on how narrowly or
broadly the Court frames Claiborne, the case may or may not have a
substantial impact on guideline-centric Booker minimalism among the
circuits.
1. United States v. Claiborne
In Claiborne, the district court correctly calculated a 37-46 month
guideline range resulting from the defendant's guilty pleas for possession
of cocaine base.30 7 The court acknowledged the guideline range but sen-
tenced the defendant to 15 months.30 8 It justified the variance based on
the defendant's lack of criminal history, youth, the small quantity of
drugs involved, and the court's opinion that he was unlikely to commit
similar crimes in the future. 30 9 The government appealed the 15-month
sentence as unreasonable under § 3553(a).31 °
On appeal, Claiborne vacated the district court's below-guideline
sentence as substantively unreasonable. 31' The court examined the rea-
sons the district judge had cited for the variance and criticized some on




While the district court had "properly considered" the unlikelihood the
defendant would reoffend as a basis for its variance, Claiborne disputed
the weight that the finding should have based on the fact that the defen-
dant had been charged with possession of cocaine on more than one oc-
casion in the past.313 The Claiborne court did not comment on the dis-
trict court's other justification about the defendant's young age, but nev-
ertheless found that the district court's reasons for varying the sentence
were not "extraordinary. 3 14 Because a district court's reasons for vary-
ing a sentence must be compelling "to the extent of the difference be-
tween the [Guidelines] advisory range and the sentence imposed, 315 the
district court's "60 percent" downward variance from the lower end of
the Guideline range was "extraordinary... [and] not supported by com-
parably extraordinary circumstances.,
316








315. Id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423,426-27 (7th Cir. 2005)).
316. Id. The discrepancy between a sentence and the applicable guideline range is typically
described as either a percentage of a sentence's variance from the guideline range or simply the
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2. Proportionality: Non-Guideline Sentences Presumptively Unrea-
sonable?
Proportionality in Claiborne, as in other circuits, employs levels of
scrutiny when evaluating non-guideline sentences. District courts must
justify such sentences by citing extenuating offender characteristics or
offense conduct proportional to the extent of the variance.3 t7 Proportion-
ality asks if, in light of the extenuating § 3553(a) factors, the non-
guideline sentence was reasonable.3 t8
Appellate review of non-guideline sentences is an important issue
because it relates to the extent judges have discretion to individually tai-
lor sentences. 31 9  That the Guidelines were "advisory" and that judges
had more discretion to vary sentences is precisely what prevented the
Guidelines from being declared unconstitutional in Booker.320  Examin-
ing proportionality is therefore important because "it is the non-
Guideline presumptions, rather than the guideline presumptions, that
express most clearly the threat of appellate reversal associated with this
exercise of discretion.,
321
If proportionality means that non-guideline sentences are presumed
unreasonable on appeal, then post-Booker sentencing begins to look like
the mandatory system that Booker struck down.322 Claiborne arises from
the Eighth Circuit, which has held that guideline sentences are presump-
tively reasonable.323 When a court adopting presumptive reasonableness
also adopts proportionality, the question naturally arises whether there is
a presumption of unreasonableness for non-guideline sentences. The
circuit courts that have addressed this question have held that non-
guideline sentences are not presumptively unreasonable. 324  The courts
number of months' difference between the sentence and the guideline range. Compare Claiborne,
439 F.3d at 481 (focusing on the "60 percent" variance from the lower end of the guideline range),
with United States v. Maloney, 466 F.3d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 2006) (focusing on the "number of the
number of offense levels traversed by a variance").
317. See discussion supra Part IllB; see also United States v. Bishop, 469 F.3d 896, 907 (10th
Cir. 2006) ("[T]he extremity of the variance between the actual sentence imposed and the applicable
Guidelines range should determine the amount of scrutiny we give to the district court's substantive
sentence.").
318. Cage, 451 F.3d at 594-95.
319. Citron, supra note 245, at 151.
320. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
321. Citron, supra note 245, at 151.
322. Hernandez, supra note 159, at 252.
323. Lincoln, 413 F.3d at 716.
324. See, e.g., United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 433 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 664-665 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Although sentences within the Guidelines range
are afforded a presumption of reasonableness, sentences falling outside the Guidelines range are
neither presumptively reasonable nor presumptively unreasonable."); United States v. Howard, 454
F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Myers, 439 F.3d 415, 417 (8th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that although guideline
sentences are presumptively reasonable, it "does not mean, however, that a variance sentence is
presumptively unreasonable" (citation omitted)).
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recognize that such a holding "would transform an 'effectively advisory'
system.., into an effectively mandatory one" that violates Booker.
325
Interestingly, though, courts do not ignore the fact that guideline
sentences are presumptively reasonable when weighing non-guideline
sentences. 326 Indeed, in some cases "the presumption in favor of guide-
line sentences has been cited as a decisional factor in several cases where
the sentence imposed was a downward variance. 327
The fact that the presumption for Guideline sentences was even cited
in these cases suggests that the presumption's influence has begun to
creep into judges' consideration of all sentences .... In other words,
the very inference that should not be drawn from the presumption-
that non-Guideline sentences are presumptively unreasonable-may
be taking hold.
328
Regardless of what the circuit courts have asserted, using presumptive
reasonableness as a method of evaluating guideline sentences along with
proportionality as a method of evaluating non-guideline sentences may
be creating an implicit presumption of unreasonableness for non-
guideline sentences. This is an important issue that Claiborne allows the
Supreme Court to consider.
Part V proposes one approach to reasonableness review that would
refine the use of proportionality and address the concern that it inhibits
judicial discretion in violation of Booker.
3. Impact of Claiborne
The difficulty in evaluating proportionality is that the nature of its
inquiry-whether circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary to justify
a substantial variance-"is not one that allows for precision in measure-
ment." 329 The Tenth Circuit, for example, has noted that "there are no
strict guideposts that invoke certain levels of scrutiny; there is no for-
mula into which we input the degree of divergence in order to generate
precisely how compelling the district court's reasons need be. 33 ° The
rule requiring "extraordinary circumstances" for "substantial variances"
may be so vague that it means very little outside the fact-specific context
of each particular case.
In Claiborne, the Supreme Court therefore faces the difficulty of
weighing an issue that is admittedly ambiguous and that varies in every
325. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d at 1239-40 (quoting Moreland, 437 F.3d at 433).
326. Hemandez, supra note 159, at 252; see, e.g., Cage, 451 F.3d at 593 ("Our holding in
Kristl, that within-the-guidelines sentences are entitled to a presumption of reasonableness, speaks to
how we should consider sentences outside the guidelines range." (emphasis added)).
327. Hernandez, supra note 159, at 252.
328. Id. (internal footnote omitted).
329. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d at 1240.
330. Id.
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instance. The Court will be reviewing whether circuits have erred in
requiring "extraordinary" circumstances when sentences "substantially"
vary from the Guidelines. Yet the circuits themselves have acknowl-
edged that these are difficult terms to define in a way that would allow
for a ruling that applies in every circuit.
The Claiborne case, like Rita, leaves the Court with significant lati-
tude in deciding the issue before it. What the decision will mean for
lower courts depends on how broadly the Supreme Court defines propor-
tionality. How would its rejection of proportionality affect those circuits
who do not explicitly adopt proportionality but nevertheless find the
Guidelines helpful "in calibrating the review for reasonableness"?
331
Would courts still be permitted to identify the Guidelines as "not just
another factor" and as deserving "heavy weight" in reasonableness re-
view?
332
These questions relate to the basic issue that Booker minimalism
presents-i.e., whether the Guidelines have a special weight in sentenc-
ing and in appellate review among the § 3553(a) factors. If the Court
rules on proportionality but fails to address the underlying issue of
Booker minimalism, the pattern of guideline sentences that has occurred
in the aftermath of Booker may continue.
V. BALANCING BOOKER MINIMALISM WITH BOOKER AND § 3553(a)
As previously discussed,333 Rita and Claiborne highlight the tension
existing between Booker minimalism on one side and the exercise of
independent judicial discretion required by § 3553(a) and Booker on the
other. The specific issues in these cases-presumptive reasonableness
and proportionality-are the vehicles that allow for the Supreme Court to
consider this tension.
A. A New Standard of Reasonableness Review
One way to balance this tension would be for district courts to im-
pose non-guideline sentences whenever the Guidelines fail to account for
or inadequately account for offense conduct or offender characteristics.
This would mean that the presumption of reasonableness and proportion-
ality violate Booker whenever nonfrivolous circumstances exist for
which the Guidelines do not already account or for which they inade-
quately account.334 This approach would provide an appropriate balance
between guideline-centric Booker minimalism and the requirements of
Booker and § 3553(a). It may also represent an improved approach to
331. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 133.
332. See Cage, 451 F.3d at 593; United States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006).
333. See supra Part IV.A.
334. 1 am sincerely grateful to Benji McMurray for providing this basic formulation and for
assisting in developing it. See United States v. Sosa-Acosta, 06-4174, Appellant's Br. at 12-13.
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reasonableness review in the Tenth Circuit and is one way of addressing
Rita and Claiborne.
The Guidelines already account for a number of factors properly
considered under § 3553(a).3 35 This is not surprising considering that
Congress explicitly instructed the USSC to promulgate Guidelines that
would meet the "purposes of sentencing as set forth in [§ 3553(a)(2)]. ' 336
These are the same purposes that all of the § 3553(a) factors are directed
toward-i.e., the need for a sentence to reflect the seriousness of the of-
fense, to deter future criminal conduct, to protect the public from further
crimes, and to provide the defendant with needed treatment.337 So, for
example, the Guidelines contain a number of "adjustments" that can be
made to a guideline calculation based on the role that a defendant had in
a crime.338 If the defendant's role was "minimal" or "minor," it may
justify up to a four-level decrease in that defendant's offense level.33 9
Or, a defendant admitting guilt is entitled to a three-level decrease in his
or her offense level calculation. 340 A defendant's previous criminal his-
tory or lack thereof is also already part of the guideline calculation.341
When the Guidelines account for all relevant § 3553(a) factors in a
particular case, a guideline-centric approach is appropriate. In such
cases, a presumption of reasonableness for guideline sentences would not
violate Booker because the Guidelines reflect the relevant offender char-
acteristics and offense conduct.342 For the same reason, proportionality
would be a valid method of reviewing the sentence if it fell outside the
Guidelines.
As detailed in Part II, the Guidelines expressly avoid consideration
of a number of possibly mitigating offender characteristics.343 Because
these characteristics "are difficult to measure systematically and cannot
be easily plotted on a sentencing chart,",344 they are not ordinarily re-
flected in a guideline range. Such characteristics include, among others,
a defendant's age, physical or mental status, education, and military or
civil service.345
335. See, e.g., United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 735-36 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J.,
concurring) (detailing how the Guidelines reflect other § 3553(a) factors); United States v. Wilson,
350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 915 (D. Utah 2005).
336. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (2000).
337. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000).
338. USSG, supra note 1, § 3B 1.2.
339. Id.
340. Id. § 3El.1.
341. Id. § 4Al.1.
342. Note that this presumption would apply only to the substantive as opposed to the proce-
dural component of the sentence. See discussion supra Part IVA. I.
343. See supra Part II.C. 1.
344. Berman, supra note 147, at 290.
345. See USSG, supra note 1, § 5H1.1-1.12.
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Whenever such circumstances are present, the presumption of rea-
sonableness and proportionality inhibit the judicial discretion required by
Booker and § 3553(a).346 The reason these circumstances are not in-
cluded in the Guidelines is precisely because they require the type of
individualized judicial consideration that Congress had envisioned in
§ 3553(a) and that Booker had mandated. Their presence in a particular
case means that the Guidelines, by themselves, inadequately reflect the
relevant sentencing concerns. In such cases, presumptive reasonableness
and proportionality impair appellate courts' reasonableness review by
unjustifiably centering it around the Guidelines.
B. Cases Where the Guidelines Inadequately Reflect § 3553(a) Factors
Even in those cases where the Guidelines account for all relevant
§ 3553(a) factors, presumptive reasonableness and proportionality may
yet be inappropriate.
In particular, they should not be used whenever the Guidelines in-
adequately account for either offense conduct or offender characteris-
tics. 347 These situations can arise frequently. The most prominent and
criticized example of the Guidelines inadequately accounting for offense
conduct is the 100:1 crack/powder cocaine disparity in sentencing.
348
Under this system, it takes 100 times less crack cocaine than it does
powder cocaine to equal the same offense level.349  Though the
crack/powder cocaine disparity may receive the most attention, other
examples can be found as well. One federal district court sentenced a
defendant to time served plus three months of supervised release for ille-
gal possession of a sawed-off shotgun even though the guideline range
called for a 20-30 month sentence.35 ° In justifying this variance, the
court cited the "almost innocent circumstances surrounding the shorten-
346. This applies only to nonfrivolous circumstances and arguments. See, e.g., United States v.
Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2005) ("A sentencing judge has no more duty than we
appellate judges do to discuss every argument made by a litigant; arguments clearly without merit
can, and for the sake ofjudicial economy should, be passed over in silence." (citations omitted)).
347. Amy Baron-Evans, National Sentencing Resource Counsel for the Federal Public and
Community Defenders, has compiled a number of instances where courts have determined that the
Guidelines inaccurately account for offense conduct or offender characteristics. See Sentencing
Post-Booker, Apr. 10, 2006, at 13-14, http://www.fd.org/pdf lib/sentencing41006.pdf. The Myers
example given in this paragraph comes from Baron-Evans's compilation.
348. Id. at 15-16. The United States Sentencing Commission has questioned whether this
disparity is justified. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY viii (2002) [hereinafter USSC SPECIAL
REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/rcongress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf, see also
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST
FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW (2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/drugpolicy/
cracksinsystem_20061025.pdf.
349. USSC SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 348, at iv. Note that this is an issue in Claiborne as
well. United States v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479, 480-81 (8th Cir. 2006).
350. United States v. Myers, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032 (S.D. Iowa 2005).
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ing of the Defendant's gun" as one of a number of circumstances inade-
quately accounted for in the Guidelines.351
Courts have also recognized that the career offender Guideline
(USSG § 4B 1.1) in particular "can produce a penalty greater than neces-
sary to satisfy the purposes of sentencing." 352 For example, the Second
Circuit has noted that:
In some circumstances, a large disparity in [the relationship between
the Guideline-mandated increase and the nature of the previous
crime] might indicate that the career offender sentence provides a de-
terrent effect so in excess of what is required in light of the prior sen-
tences and especially the time served on those sentences as to consti-
tute a mitigating circumstance present "to a degree" not adequately
considered by the Commission.
353
In at least one instance the Tenth Circuit has expressed "grave misgiv-
ings" about whether the § 4B 1.1 career offender Guideline accurately
accounted for the facts in a particular case.3 54 In an opinion authored by
Judge McConnell, the court questioned whether a procedurally proper
16-level guideline enhancement for a previous conviction was neverthe-
less unreasonable in light of the nature of that previous crime. 355 Though
the defendant's attorney failed to raise the issue, the court on its own
indicated that this would be an instance where "an exercise of Booker
discretion could mitigate a sentence that does not fit the particular facts
of the case. 356
Presumptive reasonableness and proportionality thus violate Booker
not only when the Guidelines fail to address particular circumstances, but
also when the they fail to address the circumstances adequately. Prohib-
iting these methods of appellate review in such instances ensures that all
relevant offense conduct and offender characteristics are taken into ac-
count and that courts are able to appropriately exercise the judicial dis-
cretion required by § 3553(a).357
351. Myers, 353 F. Supp at 1032.
352. United States v. Fernandez, 436 F. Supp. 2d 983, 988 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (citing United
States v. Mishoe, 241 F.3d 214, 220 (2d Cir. 2001)).
353. Mishoe, 241 F.3d at 220.
354. United States v. Hemandez-Castillo, 449 F.3d 1127, 1131 (10th Cir. 2006).
355. Hernandez-Castillo, 449 F.3d at 1131.
356. Id. at 1132. Note that the Sanchez-Juarez case, which outlined the requirements of proce-
dural reasonableness in the Tenth Circuit, resulted from a defendant arguing that the Guidelines
inadequately accounted for a previous conviction. United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109,
1117 (10th Cir. 2006). See discussion supra Part I.D.
357. Cf Berman, supra note 147, at 288 ("[N]o matter what theories or goals are pursued
within a sentencing system, both offense conduct and offender characteristics should play a signifi-
cant role in sentencing decisionmaking.").
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CONCLUSION
United States v. Booker rendered the Guidelines "effectively advi-
sory," but post-Booker case law and sentencing statistics indicate that
courts nevertheless continued to view them as more than advisory. In-
deed, most adopted a "Booker minimalist" approach that interpreted the
case as having made only a modest adjustment to the role of the Guide-
lines. Though no longer mandatory, the Guidelines maintained a special
weight in sentencing and in appellate review compared to the other §
3553(a) sentencing factors.
The Tenth Circuit provides an example of how many appellate
courts adopted a Booker minimalist approach in reviewing district court
sentences for reasonableness. The court presumes that guideline sen-
tences are reasonable, but requires district courts to justify non-guideline
sentences by citing extenuating circumstances proportional to the extent
of the variances. Not all circuits adopted the "presumption of reason-
ableness" and "proportionality" methods of reviewing guideline and non-
guideline sentences. But even these circuits exhibit a Booker minimalist
approach to their review that tends to equate the Guidelines with reason-
ableness.
This spring, the Supreme Court will consider the presumption of
reasonableness and proportionality in the Rita and Claiborne cases. At
issue is whether these methods of appellate review violate Booker. The
prominence of Booker minimalism among even those circuits that reject
presumptive reasonableness and proportionality raises an important ques-
tion about what effect it would have if the Court were to strike down
either method. If the Court fails to address the underlying issue of
Booker minimalism-i.e., that the Guidelines have a special weight
among the § 3553(a) factors-the post-Booker pattern of guideline sen-
tences may continue.
In addition, the unusual definition of "presumption of reasonable-
ness" in Rita means that the Supreme Court could fashion a narrow opin-
ion that would have only a limited impact. Whereas in almost every cir-
cuit the presumption of reasonableness applies only to the substantive
(length) component of a district court's sentence, in Rita it applies to the
procedural component as well. The Court could reject the presumption
as it applies to procedural reasonableness without addressing its ordinary
application to substantive reasonableness. A narrow opinion focused
only on this procedural component might achieve greater unanimity
within the Court, but it would come at the price of a lost opportunity to
address how the presumption of reasonableness ordinarily functions in
appellate review.
The underlying issue in the Rita and Claiborne cases is the tension
that exists between Booker minimalism on one side and the exercise of
independent judicial discretion required by § 3553(a) and Booker on the
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other. One compelling justification for guideline-centric Booker mini-
malism is the important role of the Guidelines in promoting sentencing
uniformity. The justification is imperfect, though, because the Guide-
lines do not account for a number of circumstances that judges must al-
ways consider when fashioning a "sufficient, but not greater than neces-
sary" sentence under § 3553(a). The Guidelines do not account for these
circumstances precisely because they merit individualized judicial con-
sideration. Furthermore, even when the Guidelines account for certain
circumstances, they may do so inadequately. Common examples include
the 100:1 crack/powder cocaine disparity and the occasionally rigid ca-
reer offender guideline section. The individualized judicial consideration
required by Booker and § 3553(a) is therefore undermined by Booker
minimalism whenever the Guidelines fail to account for or inadequately
account for all relevant sentencing considerations.
One way to balance this tension would be for district courts to im-
pose non-guideline sentences whenever the Guidelines fail to account for
or inadequately account for offense conduct or offender characteristics.
This would mean that appellate courts should refrain from using the pre-
sumption of reasonableness or proportionality whenever nonfrivolous
circumstances exist for which the Guidelines do not already account or
for which they inadequately account. Rejecting presumptive reasonable-
ness or proportionality when these circumstances are present prevents
courts from unjustifiably centering their appellate review around the
Guidelines.
The approach to reasonableness review outlined here incorporates
the goal of sentencing uniformity but ensures that courts also account for
defendants' individual circumstances. A Booker minimalist approach
can aid courts in pursuing uniformity, but true uniformity can only be
achieved when circumstances that the Guidelines ignore or inaccurately
reflect are also considered. The sentencing statute, after all, calls for
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities, not sentencing disparities
per se.358 Rejecting presumptive reasonableness or proportionality in
these cases may not yield a "formal outcome equality," 359 but any dis-
parities that result would not be unwarranted.36 ° Uniformity would thus
be achieved not by requiring equal sentencing outcomes, but by ensuring
that every defendant's sentence reflects the proper balance of sentencing
considerations. District courts should be secure in their ability to exer-
358. § 3553(a)(6).
359. Marc L. Miller, The Foundations of Law: Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L.J.
271,277 (2005)
360. § 3553(a)(6); see also Miller, supra note 359, at 275 (noting that "[Congress] sought to
reduce 'unwarranted' sentencing disparities though guidelines" and that variations were implicitly
warranted in the "listing [of] various factors for the Commission to consider .... ).
[Vol. 84:3
2007] FEDERAL SENTENCING & REASONABLENESS REVIEW 879
cise "reasoned judgment '' 36' in sentencing whenever the Guidelines fail
to account for important § 3553(a) factors.
Jeffrey S. Hurd
361. Berman, supra note 17, at 388; see also Gertner, supra note 117, at 140-41 ("Reasonable-
ness review should mean . . . interpreting the Guidelines not as atomistic civil code rules, but in
context, in the light of all the § 3553(a) purposes.").
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